EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim
at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which
all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others
are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from
the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as
there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the
medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of
economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and
the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and
this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet
others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the
subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It
makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or
something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake
(everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything
for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so
that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief
good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not,
like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so,
we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or
capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and
that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it
is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each
class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see
even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics,
rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this
science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For
even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at
all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it
is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to
attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry
aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter
admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than
in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science
investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be
thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a
similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been
undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be
content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth
roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true
and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same
spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an
educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of
the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a
mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so
the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man
who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is
not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the
actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and,
further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable,
because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether
he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on
his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons,
as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in
accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great
benefit.
**********
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems
different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in
the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake
everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture
a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for
it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is
an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are
more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to
state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose
some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something
else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something
final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if
there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call
that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit
for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of
something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for
the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which
is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always
for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every
virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still
choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by
means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake
of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the
final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that
which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for
parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is
born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement
to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us
examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as
that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think
happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being
counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made
more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes
an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is
something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a
clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could
first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an
artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the
'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a
function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and
has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of
the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function
apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but
we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition
and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even
to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element
that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of
being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought.
And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in
the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the
term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a
rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which
is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in
all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for
the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do
so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of
life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and
the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any
action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate
excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance
with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most
complete.
But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does
one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it
roughly, and then later fill in the details.
**********
Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see
the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also the case that a man is happy
when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is
an activity? But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not mean this,
but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and
misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil and good are thought
to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g.
honours and dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of
descendants. And this also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to
old age and has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants-
some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others the opposite
may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship between them and their
ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in
these changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be
odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for some time have some effect on the
happiness of their ancestors.
But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration of it our
present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and only then call a man
happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that
when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him
because we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall
them, and because we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means
easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly
if we were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and
again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and insecurely based. Or is this
keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on
these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere additions, while virtuous
activities or their opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.
The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function of man has
so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even than
knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable
because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these;
for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question,
then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always,
or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and
contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously,
if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.
Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of
good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or
the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life happier
(for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals
with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim
happiness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in
these nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes,
not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.
If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy man can become
miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is
truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances life becomingly and always makes the
best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his
command and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and
so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become
miserable; though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of
Priam.
Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will he be moved from his
happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only by many great ones, nor, if
he has had many great misadventures, will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if
at all, only in a long and complete one in which he has attained many splendid successes.
When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete
virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but
throughout a complete life? Or must we add 'and who is destined to live thus and die as
befits his life'? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an
end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in
whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled- but happy men. So much for these
questions.
