
*Questioning Heidegger's Silence:
A Postmodern Topology*

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INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger's silence regarding his Nazi past is not simply a failure to condemn the fascist trajectory of thirteen years of Nazi rule. As the silence of a philosopher who was repeatedly questioned on the matter of Auschwitz, the same matter that crushed but did not silence Adorno, Heidegger's silence speaks as a deliberate failure to name the name of the Jews, the victims of the Holocaust. What can be said about this failure, about this silence, philosophically and otherwise?

For his part, Heidegger's reflections on language as saying (and silence as a mode of discourse) enjoin silence: "Saying will not let itself be captured in any statement. It demands of us that we achieve by silence the appropriating, initiating movement within the being of language—and do so without talking about silence."¹ Thus, Heidegger's "A Dialogue on Language" investigates language as a saying correspondence from within language rather than as discourse about language. The Japanese partner observes, "The course of such a dialogue would have to have a character all its own, with more silence than talk." Heidegger's own interlocutor reinforces this description: "Above all, silence about silence. . . ." In turn, the being "silent of silence" is named "authentic saying."²

How can one speak about silence without language, without words on silence? In what follows, I cannot be silent about silence—as, indeed, Heidegger himself was not and could not be. I seek to address not language but silence. It is my intention thereby to come to some understanding of Heidegger's own de-etherealized, convicted silence on his past. In this endeavor it may be recalled that what we know about the guilt and volubility of silence is not just a legacy of Freudian psychoanalysis or Nietzschean genealogies but is also the effort of hermeneutic phenomenology, which is the gift of Heidegger's reflection on thought.

I seek to pose the question of Heidegger's silence as a question in the Heideggerian sense. Beyond questions of reception and the issue of political, ideological condemnation, the question of Heidegger's silence entails a special consideration of Heidegger's understanding of the significance of silence. The question of what may be called Heidegger's *silences* then comprises the questions concerning his political, factual silence as well as his philosophical questioning of the nature of language and silence. Below, I hope to articulate the resulting play of silences as a productive ambivalence coordinately enhancing an understanding not only of the philosopher's silence but silence itself.

What was Heidegger's understanding of silence? What was the significance of his silence, particularly his silence on his own words, his publicly proclaimed and published statements: the troublesome *Rektoratsrede*; the passages proclaiming the "inner truth and greatness"³ of Nazism which were never silenced even if—and this too is debated—abridged. We cannot begin to answer these questions without a double consideration of Heidegger's own philosophical understanding of silence and the convicted, unremitting silence that damns him in our eyes.

Essentially ambiguous, the question of the proposed conjunction of Heidegger's silence as philosophically articulated and Heidegger's silence on his involvement and philosophical complicity with the political principles of Nazism requires such a duplication of terms. But such a doubling of silences is not proposed for the sake of equivocation. Both silences are to be interrogated, the reflective as well as the public silence, in order finally to resolve the positive tension of ambiguity or else to abandon this dyad within the blinking duplicity of scandal. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that without a hermeneutic of the question of Heidegger's silence, the inquiry must fail as an inquiry. This is also to say, and it is important to say it, that lacking the very Heideggerian question of the question, the

question of Heidegger's silence has not yet been and cannot be posed as a question.

For an authentic questioning, it is imperative that we heed Heidegger's recollection of the nature of questioning. In his investigation into the nature of language, Heidegger noted that all questions require "the prior grant of whatever it is they approach and pursue with their queries."⁴ This gift or grant is the antithesis of calculating challenge. Hence, what is wanted in questioning "is not a putting of questions—rather, it is a listening to the grant, the promise of what is to be put in question" (NL 71). We shall find that such an attending to "what is to be put in question" is hard to achieve and even more difficult to sustain. Just as questioning is always guided in advance by what it seeks, listening, in its necessary correlative, shares the anticipatory structure of questioning as a listening inclination. Seen from within its own hermeneutic and phenomenological prospect, listening is always a listening *for*. As seekers, as listeners, our "listening is a listening for the countering word." The countering word is the word of recognition, the answering word. But in wary attunement, in the sensitivity of thoughtful response, the countering word also awaits challenge. Thus, like questioning, listening is a *possibility* of attentive comportment. We are always ahead of ourselves as listeners, but without listing balance if we listen without regard for this dispositional response. Then listening becomes a demand that "develops into our asking for the answer" (NL 75), and fails to listen for the answering word of attunement.

On the early Heidegger's understanding of questioning, "every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought."⁵ This projective understanding remains central to Heidegger's thought; in the 1957 essay, "The Nature of Language," we find, "Every question . . . is already borne up by the grant of what is to come into question" (NL 75). For the present hermeneutic purpose of questioning questioning, I will need to distinguish two styles of questioning.

The first, ordinary question—and indeed, the immediate question concerning Heidegger's silence, questioning the significance of that silence in terms of what his silence confesses concerning his guilt—is a *problematical* kind of questioning. This kind of questioning listens for nothing like a countering attunement. Instead, problematical questioning demands a plain account—an answer guided by the facts it has in advance. In the Kantian spirit, the satisfaction of this questioning demand corresponds to the concurrence of the witness, whether that witness be nature, or a text under investigation,

or a criminal suspect, or, indeed, a philosopher. But the answer-directed, satisfaction-compelling question of a given problematic—in the case at hand, the advance conviction of the question of Heidegger's guilt and the matter of Heidegger's shame—is not the only way of questioning.

Where problematical questioning starts out at its goal, the alternative style of questioning takes its point of departure from "that which is to be found out by the asking" (NL 75). This way of questioning is authentic just because it has the character of a seeking.⁶ For Heidegger, the challenging force of problematical questioning does not correspond to the essence of the questioning he called the *piety of thought*. For Heidegger, "the true stance of thinking cannot be to put questions, but must be to listen to that which our questioning vouchsafes" (NL 72). If the question of this present chapter is to be posed in an authentic or essential fashion, what is to be found out is the questionableness of Heidegger's silence as such.⁷

But if there are two ways of posing the question of Heidegger's silence, there are also two ways to understand the notion of silence itself in this same context. Heidegger's silence can be heard privately, as a Nazi, effectively anti-Semitic silence betraying personal failure and granting shameful consent—complicity—without the least admission of guilt. This is the now-standard interpretation of Heidegger's silence, and it accuses and condemns Heidegger's vain involvement with Nazism and his cowardliness and pettiness in whitewashing and denying his intimate and ongoing concord with the Nazi ethos in public statements made in the years after 1945. But beyond this standard statement of Heidegger's guilt, Heidegger's silence can be understood to be an authentic disclosure in the light of Heidegger's philosophic reflections on language and thought.⁸ As such a disclosure, it can be said that the project of the later Heidegger is silence. In "The Way to Language" he writes, "Silence corresponds to the soundless tolling of the stillness of appropriating-showing Saying" (WL 131). By this correspondence, in speaking of the ringing of silence as *geläuter Stille*, Heidegger understands "the soundless gathering call, by which Saying moves the world-relation on its way" (NL 108). This soundless invocation is "the ringing of stillness. It is: the language of Being." So understood as the soundless, gathering calling that calls without a caller, the Saying that Says without a Sayer, silence is the poetic touchstone: "the breaking up of the word." This breaking up means that "the sounding word returns into soundlessness . . . into the ringing of stillness." This gathering echo is "the true step back on the way of thinking."

In the postmodern schema, aligning the intellectual culture of suspicion and indifference, the topological register of silence is always a pregnant one, always multifarious, and always betraying and betrayed.⁹ This is not least because of the echoing of silence, its implicit address to another. In the distal echoing of its significance, the silence of refusal—the voice that fails to speak in silence—is heard to confess its own guilt. This distant and foreign silence speaks from the side of defiance, pride, and shame. Such silence does not conceal its contempt for the human demand for community and understanding. Yet silence can also be understood proximally—from the side of forbearance or reverent intimacy and solicitous regard. Thus conceived from within, silence is the mask or surface of a receptive species of *reticence*, relinquishing judgment, acknowledging failure, and deflecting and recoiling from disappointment, in the quiet that tentatively awaits the possibility of the redemption of ambiguity. What is glimpsed in this redemption is the flash of the impossibility of comprehension.¹⁰ This realm of silence is the shadowed side of the thinker's recognition of his own finitude as it admits the thinker into a community of finitude and the pain of realizing that all vectors of human redemption—whether offering a salvation granted by the "spirit" of a people or represented by one man or one political movement or ideology, even one philosophy—are sometimes, more than ordinarily but dismally, horrifyingly flawed.¹¹ This same recognition is also the silent joy, as Nietzsche names it, ringing in the character of Oedipus at Colonus. Defeated and wounded, finally freed of his excess of vision and in the quiet wisdom of the mystic's *Gelassenheit*, Oedipus affirms his Sophoclean darkness, with a benediction and the same equanimity with which Odysseus faced Nausicaä, blessing life. If Heidegger's silence may be similarly conceived, although distanced from the heroic image of tragedy, we can regard silence as the nontactical, nontactiturn but still open reticence of a thinking that attends but does not calculate understanding.¹² As the reticent expression of the thinking that has learned how to listen, the tentative word of silence waits.

THE QUESTION OF HEIDEGGER'S SILENCE

I have claimed that it is essential to trace the question of Heidegger's silence by noting the terms that are at stake in the debate regarding Heidegger's Nazism. I hold that one must ask why

Heidegger kept and maintained silence on a topic that all the world has talked about and which continues to terrorize the human heart. It is this same silence which his followers have more or less sought to preserve, while nevertheless capitulating to the public pressure for a final word, so that the premature (if one considers Heidegger's own schedule and plan) publication of the *Beiträge* is a concession to public pressure for free access to texts representing Heidegger's thought in the Nazi era, as the important years in controversy. To those of us, apologists as well as detractors, who find Heidegger's silence lacking, who hear it as a mark of Heidegger's shameful and factual complicity with the Nazi ethos, what is in question is whether this silence should be spoken of as a crime.

I have conceded that the crime of everyday silence is denial. What is oppressed by this silence is the past, and it is this past that is ever newly manifest in the guilty return of the obliterated, the conviction of the repressed. This guilty caesura marking the moment of ordinary, criminal silence thus repeats in the obliteration of traces, in the imposition of a supplement, in the addition of parentheses, in the suppression of a manuscript page. Hence, the ordinary, problematical questioning concerning Heidegger's silence questions the significance of that very silence in terms of what his silence confesses about his past and lifelong guilt, or, abysmally, the horror to which his silence has given consent.

Why not speak the name of the Jews in the name of the mass crime that was done against them, in the name of the Holocaust, the Shoah? *Why not* speak out in the name of the Jews, cry out for the sake of the Jews, pronounce the nature of the crime in the name of its victims? In earnest and, above all, exasperation, why not confess one's own shame and guilt, one's own responsibility as a participant on so many levels in this sad century of unspeakable horror, its impossible wars, its tactical logics, and its continuing techniques of terror as they are dispersed and regathered in the simulacra of the Western world?¹³ This is the very fulcrum and these are the sore points of the question of Heidegger's "terrible silence," in Derrida's words, or, following Levinas's damning judgment, his near consent "to horror."¹⁴ For, make no mistake, the question is not the question of an assault on modernity, the issue is not merely that of believing in the "inner truth and greatness" of a political movement—apart from anti-Semitism, biologism, and the final solution—but these very things at their impossible extreme. It is to this issue, the issue of anti-Semitism, as the issue of Nazism and the Holocaust, that we pose and cannot but pose the questions: *Why not speak? Why not*

apologize? Why not confess redemptive remorse? Why not denounce one's past, the shame of one's people?

But there are, as suggested above, at least two ways to pursue such needful questions. On the one hand, the question of Heidegger's silence can be posed as it has been up till now, poised to condemn and thus answered in advance. As we have seen, this is the problematical questioning that accuses. But, on the other hand, along the path of questioning I have sought to undertake in this essay, the question may be posed hermeneutically. Here, deliberately following Heidegger in order to track Heidegger in this question, one seeks to know where one does not claim to know in advance, one seeks to understand where a judgment has not already been uttered.

It may be possible, of course, to hold and to prove that Heidegger's political insights or allegiances have no more to do with the substance of his thought than the fondness he may have had for rustic footwear, Swabian soups, or whole-grain breads. Or else it may be that his political acts, different from personal preferences regarding dress or food, involve his philosophy with important implications for the practical or principal philosophical question, "What must I do?"¹⁵ If the latter is true (as, along with many others, I believe), we are not released from the responsibility of the hermeneutic interrogation already begun. There is no ready negative judgment by association.¹⁶ To continue this question of the question, we must be prepared once again to follow the Heideggerian project for thinking. This time we must attend not to Heidegger's way but to the way of Heidegger's way of thought, asking questions (after Heidegger's fashion) in thoughtful reappropriation. The task is not easy, and it is likely to be unfulfilling and, at least for a time, possibly unfulfilled. As William J. Richardson cautions in another context: "Foundational thought . . . is always an indigent thing. . . it can never be anything more than tentative."¹⁷ In the present context, the issue is the relevance of the tentative character of all beginnings, all attempts. When one eschews problematical calculation in favor of the questioning of thought, it is essential to forbear, to do without an automatic or advance answer, if only for the sake of listening.

THE REPRESSION OF SILENCE

To begin again (we may have to be prepared to begin again and yet again from now on, such is the task of uniting philosophy and politics), what is to be questioned is the silence of a philosopher and,

by extension, a philosophy conceived with reference to the *issues* of Nazism. The philosopher's silence regarding the Holocaust betrays or fails to address the issue of horror. To recognize, to name, the ashes, cinders, dust of the Holocaust is an act of commemoration; for these cinders are not the tokens of Christian sinfulness but the very bodily ashes of the dead, filtering the dull penumbra of the Holocaust which drifts and cannot settle.

The declaration of the survivors of the death camps—which includes everyone—and the Passover invocation of Jews today, supplementing the promise of Jerusalem's redeeming gold, is the imperative: "Never forget!" This is not a promise of commemoration but an injunction issued to mortal beings, to human animals—in the classic humanistic ideal: *zoon logon*. The memories of rational animals work across the bar of ratio, installed in the disproportionate tension between the timeless circuit of the unforgetting, uncomprehending currents of the unconscious and the limits of conscious attention and recollective rationalization. Hence the vow, "Never forget!" is a solemn vow of silence, a vow to break silence, even in silence, perpetually.

The vow is necessary as a command just because the animal body forgets. Yet it is only because of animal, bodily forgetfulness that silence *can* articulate the unconscious brought to speech in the body, carried by the misspoken word, the accidental, the unwithheld.¹⁸ In the same way, I submit that it is because of human forgetfulness (of the question of Being) that silence can be an *Erschweigen*, a *telling* *silence*, the foundation for what Heidegger calls another thinking.

And yet as important a commentator on just these affairs as Jürgen Habermas maintains that Heidegger's silence does not tell of anything but Heidegger's own guilt, nor does it admit of any ringing or resonant response. Heidegger's silence, once demystified in accord with the sensitively humanistic historical perspective of critical theory, *betrays* his insensitive, even petty detachment "from all relation to surface historical reality."¹⁹ Inherently duplicitous, this blind detachment is undermined by the self-exoneration typical of the bourgeois "post-war mentality" of Heidegger's time, "the milieu of the Adenauer era of repression and silence" (WW 459). Thus Habermas fits Heidegger's silence within the ranks of the everyday, repressed or guilty kind.

I have suggested that opposed to the refusing, morally paralyzing silence of commission, featuring the insensitivity that denies community, is a finite, faltering, or *reticent* kind of silence. For Heidegger, reticent, stammering, ringing silence as such—and

not the absence of speech or indeed the taciturn refusal of speech—is the very condition of the possibility of speech: “Everything spoken stems in a variety of ways from the unspoken, whether this be something not yet spoken, or whether it be what must remain unspoken in the sense that it is beyond the reach of speaking” (WL 120). The poverty of reticent silence is what can await the advent of mystery or the unknown: “that which must remain wholly unspoken is held back in the unsaid, [and] abides in concealment as unshowable” (WL 122).

In his “Letter on Humanism,” written (let us to take care to iterate the historical cascade of crises we can barely remember, let alone understand) in the postwar followed by the war and its unwinnable inversion in genocide, followed again by the postwar world, Heidegger had wondered, “Perhaps, then, language requires much less precipitous expression than proper silence” (LH 223). Such a “proper” silence, the needful silence that belongs to language, corresponding “to the soundless tolling of the silence of appropriating-showing Saying” (WL 131), is, it can be said, what Heidegger would call *Gelassenheit*. The path of silence is then the succession of a thinking that rings the circuit from the early Heidegger (I) to the later Heidegger (II) as *another thinking*. Because this thinking is another beginning (*Anfang*) and because this is the description of the *Beiträge*, the difference between Heidegger I and II is not the difference of reversal but only the inclination of a turning, and indeed a turning within and not away.

This other thinking is the thinking that is otherwise than modern. It is here that Heidegger’s own path of thinking traces the topography of the postmodern. I examine the significance of the controversial “postmodern” later. Here it is only important to note that if a thinker is postmodern, it is not to be thought that the thinker is premodern or even anti-modern. Rather, the postmodern is the condition, willy-nilly and despite all protests against the tastelessness of composite terms, of our own contemporary condition after the apices of modern achievement in the atomic age (bomb), the information age (computer), the age of imaginary transportation (the space shuttle), and so on. Beyond the innocence of an ideal of modernity that is no longer possible in such innocence, precisely because of the still unspeakable horror of the Holocaust, is the final, irrevocably consummate death of God and end of man. After this failure, what calls for thinking must abandon the centrality of the subject. This thinking is ex-centric to—Other than—ordinary, modern thinking. This otherness is foreign not just to ourselves but also, if we take him

at his word, to Heidegger himself. To overcome this distance would require a finesse beyond even Nietzsche's wildest dreams for a thinker, a philosopher with exceeding fine fingers, possessing "that filigree art of grasping and comprehending."²⁰ Citing Nietzsche's physiological exigence ("Our thinking should have a vigorous fragrance, like a wheatfield on a summer night"), Heidegger shares Nietzsche's melancholy wish when he asks in Nietzsche's name and almost in Nietzsche's voice, "How many of us today still have the senses for that fragrance?" (NL 70). In this same spirit of tenuous hope, Heidegger could repeat, "Who of us today would want to imagine that his attempts to think are at home on the path of silence?" (LH 223).

Perhaps it is in this sense—speaking of the fragile, mortal significance of silence—that we may speak of the flawed, insecure path of silence. It may be that this path also reflects the difference between the early and the later Heidegger, between "Heidegger I" and "Heidegger II." But then (and I have already indicated my dissatisfaction with this extension), the movement of the turning, the *Kezbre*, could be understood as the transformation of "Heidegger I" following upon the failure of the popular-political movement of National Socialism. Yet Heidegger himself thus articulates the topology of his thought: "The thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II."²¹ In the same way and along the same continuum, we can understand why Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe—expressing the conviction of the later Heidegger who never chose to alter the damning passage in *Introduction to Metaphysics* underlining the "inner greatness" of Nazism—refuses to speak of accidents or mistakes: "Nazism, whatever its 'reality' might have been, . . . had the possibility Heidegger saw in it . . . at least in some of its traits, with respect to the destiny of Germany and that of the West."²² After Auschwitz, after Dachau, as after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this fictitious "possibility" is the failed essence of the West: the real meaning of the "death of God," a disappointment and a devastation haltingly observed by Paul Celan and commemorated by Maurice Blanchot. In Lacoue-Labarthe's expression of this essential decomposition, in a sentiment Emmanuel Levinas, too (among many, many others), does have personal cause to confirm: "In the apocalypse at Auschwitz, it is no more or less than the essence of the West that is revealed—and that has not ceased since that time to reveal itself" (NA 484). This revelation is denied an echo or a preface in Heidegger's work, early or late. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, "It was the thought guiding this event that Heidegger

failed to recognize" (NA 484). Indeed, the Heidegger of 1949 testifies to the magnitude of this failure, when he is quoted as saying: "Agriculture [*Ackerbau*] is now a mechanized food industry. As for its essence, it is the same thing as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs."²³ Levinas, drawing out the incredibly leveling effect of this comparison, says of this passage that it is "beyond commentary" (AI 487).

It is by way of the trope of an express failing, the word that suddenly falters, by way of what scholars call *aposiopesis*—that is, the silence that breaks off speaking with pregnant exultancy, silence itself tumbling forth the obvious or else failing with a shuddering that plainly names what need not be spoken—that Levinas succeeds in rendering provocative and even eloquent commentary precisely where Heidegger's silence as well as Heidegger's words must fail to offer any account of themselves before the accusation of complicit guilt and repressed shame. And yet, if Heidegger's silence is not (or not only) the closed, taciturn silence of guilt but also, as I would suggest, the open silence of tentative finitude or reticent mortality, if silence can be heard under two species, that of guilt and that of listening, listening reticence, then Heidegger's words yet falter—*nonetheless and in the same fashion*.

The unspeakable mechanization of agriculture and death reflects the diabolical malignancy of the *Unheil* in the danger that is the calculative or productive essence of technology. This essence is difficult to conceive because the essence of technology in its current expression reveals the destiny of the "truth of Being, a truth that lies in oblivion" (LH 220). To think along with what Heidegger says here, and thereby to go beyond commentary, is to recover the trajectory of Heidegger's question of the truth of Being. For this approach to the essence of technology, it is essential to challenge the encroaching rule (*Ge-Stell*) of its achievements. Before one can think the essence of something that is in essence as neutral or ordinary as factory farming, as effectively innocent of political and economic forces as agriculture, one must relinquish both the convicted innocence of technology together with the vision of human stewardship, that is, humanistic omnipotence. In Heidegger's words: "Man is not the lord of beings" (LH 221).

For Heidegger, the ruling sway of technology obviates its societal aura of neutrality. In the banal technicization of agriculture, in accord with the all-too-routine encroachment of technology, factory farming is obviously no longer farming in the traditional sense. Today's

mechanical, factory model agribusiness is not the same as the original cultivation of the earth. Technologized, devitalized, and mechanized, agriculture is yet one more post-industrial expression of the cultural domination of what Fredric Jameson, for one, calls *late-capitalism*.²⁴ Its effects match those of technology in any other field.

For a limited example that, if controversial, may offer some commentary on the force of Heidegger's impossibly banal comparison of agriculture with "the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers," recall the modern functioning of agra-culture in contemporary practice: the food industry, including the production of grains, vegetable and fruit production, and indeed meat production. To take only the last element in the industrial extension of agriculture, just because the point in the former instances is necessarily subtler, it is worth attending to the economic function and definition of farm *animals*. In today's food industry, what is called *livestock* (read: live animal inventory or production units) is both figuratively as well as literally the material stock in trade of the meat industry. In commercial fact, then, livestock represents, in brutal but exact expression, no more than a self-renewing resource that is, in the end, "Bestandstücke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen."

Rendered in this context, I am well aware that this example may be intellectually offensive and marginal, affectively postmodern and, of course, emotionally disturbing. We are not comfortable with the routine proximity of the image presented or its blatant parallel with the death camps of the latter comparison,²⁵ and, finally, we cannot be comfortable with the style of discourse. Yet owing to our discomfort at its offensiveness, it may well unfold Heidegger's meaning where he writes in a text roughly contemporaneous with the "Ackerbau" quotation: "To healing Being first grants ascent [*Aufgang*] into grace; to raging [*dem Grimm*] its compulsion [*Andrang*] to malignancy" (LH 238).²⁶ How are these two texts to be conjoined?

The meaning of the conflict between healing grace and raging malignancy is what might be called, following Schürmann's usage, the "bifrontality" of technology. In Heidegger's essay "The Turning," first presented in 1949, the danger that reigns in the enframing essence of technology also succors what saves; yet this "saving power is not secondary to the danger. The selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving Power."²⁷ If it is the free essence of humanity that is endangered, this free essence is challenged only in terms of its responsibility. The heightening of technology is the danger posed against the free essence of humanity claimed to be necessary for "the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth."²⁸ Before one can think

the essence of technology—related as it is to truth—as a destiny within the truth of Being, one must conceive the complicit responsibility of humanity as “the shepherd of Being” (LH 221). When one relinquishes claim to lordship, a claim secured by the forgetful flight from Being, one can begin to approach “the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being’s truth” (LH 221).

What has truth, much less poverty and sheep herding, to do with technology? What have such romantic—transcendent *and* bucolic—images to do with the brutal conversion of human beings into corpses, the theft of human mortality that is extermination, the world-historical reality that was and continues to emerge in each new avatar as the Holocaust? What—if anything at all—has truth to do with agribusiness? We can ask this question by once again underlining as above the oddness or inappropriateness of the metaphorical invocation of the shepherd’s affairs. Thus, in the *Republic* (343b), Thrasymachus ridiculed Socrates who sought to use a similar trope to illustrate the aim of practical art; the shepherd’s interest, Thrasymachus claimed, is not the good of his flock but his own advantage, which last profit is ultimately secured at the slaughter-house. Of course, the shepherd of whom Heidegger speaks and the aspect of the shepherd intended by Socrates is the poetic ideal of the shepherd dwelling alongside and for the sake of his flock. Against Thrasymachus—and even against Nietzsche, who spoke against the lamb even if he never spoke on behalf of the shepherd—the possibility of a shepherd’s care is real beyond the idealism of Socrates, Heidegger, or, indeed, because this is a Western metaphor, Christ. And, if we can think it apart from the passage of time, the metaphor works. The ideal of the shepherd’s care entails a genuine involvement with the flock, thus, at least temporarily, superseding the idols of the marketplace. This ideal possibility is the attentive tenderness that grows in every farmer’s child, an openness to the animal as an essential being that grows and claims responsibility, until the subject’s heart hardens into the sure conviction of right and the settling of societal debts—the accession to the position of the father—must finally close it off.

According to Heidegger, there is more to technology and its overwhelming success than can be fathomed by humanistic achievement: “It is the constellation of Being that is uttering itself to us” (TU 48). The postsubjectivist perspective of the postmodern is the perspective that could begin to attend to this utterance. This perspective is otherwise than Being, post-American-centrist, and

thus—but not with any guarantee and not without the risk of confusion—potentially nonhierarchically pluralistic. Even where he himself may not track this perspective, Heidegger emphasizes the imperative need for such a new commencement because “we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology” (TU 48).

If we can attend to the constellation that utters itself to us in the bifrontal essence of technology, we can begin to address the question of Heidegger’s silence. Heidegger’s “failure,” to use Lacoue-Labarthe’s expression, or Heidegger’s consent to the “diabolical,” in Levinas’s unflinching words, is the failure of Heidegger’s understanding vis-à-vis the Nazi movement. It is the meaning of Auschwitz that Heidegger cannot seem to comprehend, as Habermas implies: “Heidegger dealt with the theme of humanism at a time when the images of the horror that the arriving Allies encountered in Auschwitz and elsewhere had made their way into the smallest German village” (WW 449). But we would be as remiss as most readers of the infamous “*Ackerbau*” passage if in reading and discussing this passage we yet failed to observe that it offers, in spite of its obvious insufficiency and its startling dissonance, a veritable tour of the geographic promiscuity and escalation of the pinnacle of evil. For in that passage, among whatever other references there may be, Heidegger refers to the horror of Auschwitz *and* the final solution, as well as to the plight of Berlin during the blockade, to the Ukraine “reduced to famine” by Stalin, and finally to the hydrogen bomb that devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

To say that these multifarious expressions of the aggressive essence of technique are “the same” is in no voice to excuse or absolve them, as some have claimed. “The essence of evil does not consist in the mere baseness of human action but rather in the malice of rage” (LH 237). The horror of thinking this accession to evil is the fearsome side of piety: “The coming to presence of technology gives man entry into That which, of himself, he can neither invent nor in any way make. For there is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man.”²⁹

I have observed that we do not wish to hear this fearsome expression of piety as the admission and reception of the worlding of the world, as “the nearest of all nearing that nears,” or as any kind of openness to thinking apart from metaphysics. We do not hear Heidegger’s words as the anguished speaking that breaks off (as reticent silence), but only, in Levinas’s pronouncement, “as if

consenting to horror." Thus, it is as if we would rather hear from Heidegger a bourgeois expression of shock, no matter if feigned or confused or exaggerated; it is as if we would prefer the sob of Christian repudiation, or moralizing self-denunciation, even the *mea culpa* of an honest confession, or, in Habermas's words, a "sober account of the facts" (WW 450).

These expectations are as question-worthy as the issue of Heidegger's rectitude. To question them, we can consider what Heidegger says concerning the destitution of our era and its senselessness. Towards the end of the text "Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being," composed during the years 1944–46 and included in Heidegger's volumes on Nietzsche, Heidegger writes:

As the veiled and extreme need of Being, however, needlessness [*Notlosigkeit*] reigns precisely in the age of the darkening of beings, our age of confusion, of violence and despair in human culture, of disruption and impotence of willing. Both openly and tacitly, a boundless suffering and a measureless sorrow proclaim the condition of our world a needy one.³⁰

Hearing this, let us first interrogate the persuasive ideology that compels us to take Heidegger to be speaking of anything but the need to think the terrifying destructiveness of "the planetary domination of the unthought essence of technicity" (OG 60) in its worst and, at that time—as Heidegger writes in the Nietzsche passage, in the "age of the darkening of beings"—in its impossibly palpable expression, "both overt and tacit," of "a boundless suffering and a measureless sorrow." It requires little hermeneutic skill to render this text in its lived context and to hear in it a reference to the overwhelming crimes of the recent world war(s). That we do not find this simple reading interesting or satisfying reveals as much about our demands as it does about Heidegger's silence. Heidegger goes even further when he writes, "The default of the unconcealment of Being as such releases the evanescence of all that is hale in beings. The evanescence of the hale takes the openness of the holy within it and closes it off" (NI 248, altered). Levinas is entitled to write, "Say what you will, the diabolical gives food for thought" (AI 488), but the value of that recognition should not be permitted to negate the similarity to be heard in Heidegger's earlier warning, "The closure of the holy eclipses every illumination of the divine. The deepening dark . . . conceals the lack of God" (NI 248).

THE TOPOLOGY OF POSTMODERNISM

Luc Ferry and Alain Renault conclude the last chapter of their book, *Heidegger and Modernity*, by decrying the inauthenticity of Heidegger's anti-humanism, the tradition of a code—"(if only that of the history of Being)"—as making possible "the return of the nationalistic myth and the fanatical hatred of modernity."³¹ Thus Ferry and Renault epitomize the debate on Heidegger in its "deepest significance" as "hinging on the criticism of modernity," which they take to exemplify the values of subjectivity and humanism (HM 53). To say that Heidegger is anti-modern or postmodern is also to say that he is an anti-humanist. This anti-humanism is, then, the ultimate significance of his critique of subjectivity. For Ferry and Renault, it was indeed only because of Heidegger's recidivist humanism, and in opposition to the principles of his philosophy, that he could, as a "fact" they acknowledge again and again, "criticize the biologizing reifications of Nazi anti-Semitism" (HM 107).

The project of this paper does not permit me to address the question of humanism, with its special polarization in favor of the realm of the spirit and its corresponding negation of the animal—or its denial of life, to use Nietzsche's language. The question of humanism is a labyrinth of hidden barbs, chasms, and well-appointed blind corridors. Here, in the context of the present effort, and by way of preparing a conclusion, I must address Heidegger's anti-modernism, which is also to say, the question of his postmodern standing.³² But to discuss Heidegger's postmodernity, yet another consideration of the eminently debatable meaning of the postmodern is necessary.

According to the canonic author of philosophical postmodernity, Jean-François Lyotard, the postmodern is the condition of representational knowledge in an age of information. Heidegger characterized this epistemological condition as the triumph of ratiocination, calculative, productive thought. In the technological domain, knowledge is the still-surviving, dominant expression of the reign of metaphysical hope. Referring to Wall Street and NASA, Lyotard dubs this the economic mystique and exigence of calculation.³³

The postmodern is not a moment (neither, contra Habermas, future utopian nor retro-nostalgic) beyond the modern.³⁴ Instead, what is represented by the postmodern is the unmasterable, disappointed condition of the Enlightenment ideal of modernity "after Auschwitz." That is, the postmodern is the modern in the wake of the impossible conflagration—disintegration—of the ideal of progress. The rational

image of the modern, of the ideal of progress, is the representational essence of the scientific project of the West. This logical essence has suffered an irrefragable eclipse, and the postmodern simply names the persistence of its occlusion. Knowing this, we know that the insistence of the eclipse is what calls for the necessity of silence. To speak of the occlusion as accomplished blinds us to its continuing advent.

Both Heidegger and Nietzsche named the crisis of Western metaphysical values *nihilism*. The same occlusion of values is renamed by the condition of the postmodern because in the face of the modernist ideal of human-ascendant and liberating progress, what nihilism named persists. The nihilizing occlusion of values is not a description of a fixed condition; it is rather a procession of representations, what Baudrillard names *simulacra*, the decomposition or withering of values. These (de)valuations persist in their decomposition, and the postmodern is the condition of the ineluctability of inadequacy.

Although "after Auschwitz" we have resolved never to forget, a resolution cannot eliminate the knottings of repression, as Lacan explains its ergonomic Freudian topology. If we remember six million Jews, if we remember the violent issue of anti-Semitism, if we remember the silent mass crimes of fascism, is it necessarily or somehow obliquely required that we thereby simultaneously purchase as we do the oblivion of the six or seven million others who *are said* also to have died in the death camps—that is, that we overlook the components of the "racially unfit," a catchall expletive including (along with Jews) cripples, the mentally handicapped, Gypsies, homosexuals, Jesuits, Slavs, and so on? We may yet find it necessary to prepare a historical or social hermeneutic in order to question the rhetorical hesitation that effects an eclipse of this order, so that these millions *cannot* (or should not) be counted. It is clear that it is a bitterly reprehensible crime to pretend that the Nazis did not systematically and monstrosly kill Jews. It is a further crime to claim that this systematicity, this monstrous genocide, this unmasterable Holocaust was not, in many crucial and still unthought senses, unique. But it remains as much a crime to forget that the death camps had jaws wider than the anti-Semitism which gorged them. If we cancel the memory of six or seven million for the sake of the commemoration of six million, we achieve the continuation of another kind of anti-Semitism. By the anti-Semitic expedient of despising, excluding, and monologizing, we thus invent other Jews.³⁵

But even an orgy of naming victims, even a frenzy of metonymic place-designations, adding Polish and Russian names to the name of Auschwitz, cannot resolve the question of the Holocaust because we are not yet able to ask it. As we bring the still recalcitrant issue of silence to mind, we are confronted with the inarticulate expression of a horror that cannot be touched by the resolve, "Do not forget." The polished boots of the SS at Auschwitz and the metallic black of futuristic appliances repeat the same. The silence continues in silencing silence.

Thus the question that has ever to be opened up is the automatic refusal of the question, as if it were only a Nazi issue, only an issue of anti-Semitism, only a silence that is only a bourgeois silence, a shamed silence. If we can remember the protean structure of the different expressions of the will to power, we can begin to understand the impotent self-assertion Heidegger has named *needlessness*—the expression of the homeless, uprooted, essence of humanity, its failure as Da-Sein. In the many guises of European world history it may be that only the *infra-structure*, only the tools, only the globalization of the impotent structures for preserving and increasing power differ. But who actually speaks when the impotence of power cries out? And what of truth, what of illusion? Is there any thinker, any thinking that can ask here, *whose truths?* What is wanting is a way of thought that could jostle us in our confidence. What fails is a way of disturbing the quietude of our disquiet that could engage us with such finesse that we would be able to rest in being so rustled: this is a drumming on our souls that would beat with the rhythm of the heart, teasing us, shaming us out of any imaginary phantasm of justice, by asking, ever so lightly, *whose illusions?* What thinker remains who can see any of this, even after Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche?

CONCLUSION

Heidegger was silent on the question of the Holocaust, except in ways that are too faltering for words. In the question posed to and not simply raised in accusation against Heidegger's silence, inquiry must also seek the meaning of silence conceived "as a mode of discursing," whereby "reticence Articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent" (BT 208).

Attentive reticence, or silence here understood as the possibility of authentic listening, is at the very least an essential condition for a more than merely (post)traditional community. By its nature, the necessarily confessional, public, or expressly declarative expression of a traditional community is exclusive, separating a select people from its enemies (others), installing the monolithic sense of an admitted and pledged *we* in opposition to a despised and designated *them*. In contrast to the ancient oppositional polarities now at least superficially eschewed by a postmodern, culturally pluralistic world, a reticent, that is, *listening and attending*, community is the indispensable condition for the possibility of a genuine pluralistic engagement between human beings in terms of and across all differences.

Seen in this engaged light, Heidegger's period of Nazi involvement failed at nothing so much as silence. Lending his voice to the confessional community of the Nazi party, Heidegger forsook the insight the early Heidegger had understood and that the later Heidegger had so much cause to recall: silence does not hold thoughtful understanding at bay, but keeps itself in readiness for understanding. We should not be surprised to find that this perspective endures as expressed for posthumous publication in the *Spiegel* interview, where Heidegger describes the "tentative, unassuming character of thought that strives to ponder [the] unthought" (OG 60).

In addition to the problematical reading of silence, which confesses Heidegger's human weakness, and far from the sullen refusal of historical community but conceived in its philosophical aspect, Heidegger's silence is a redemptive, glancing address that sponsors authentic listening as "a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine" and "a Being-with-one-another which is transparent." This attentive, waiting address reflects Being, which "in its giving of light, simultaneously keeps safe the concealed darkness of its origin as the unlighted" (TU 45). As Walter Benjamin has described the task of commemoration, "To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger."³⁶ Benjamin's metaphor is the metaphor of redemptive acquisition. But Nietzsche focuses on the inventive technique, against the photographic ideal of objectivity: "Man spins his web over the past and subdues it, thus he gives expression to his artistic drive—but not to his drive toward truth or justice. Objectivity and justice have nothing to do with one another."³⁷ As Heidegger captured and spun his own memory of his

own past, it is possible that he saw in it the wake of the perpetuity of the modern, the passing of the subject and his own efforts as striving "along narrow paths that do not stretch too far" (OG 65). Even this limited past can claim what Benjamin would call a *weak redemption*, woven from Heidegger's words. It is this redemption that waits in the flash of the stilling grace and malignancy that would sustain and bind a genuine community and an authentic gratitude of a thought exceeding humanism.

Notes

1. Martin Heidegger, "The Way to Language" (abbreviated "WL"), *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 111–36.
2. Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," *On the Way to Language*, 1–54, pp. 52–53.
3. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959), 199. This passage expresses Heidegger's distance from National Socialism, but it also confirms his convicted interest in its projects, its "inner truth," as he saw it. On this point, see Graeme Nicholson's excellent article, "The Politics of Heidegger's Rectoral Address," *Man and World* 20 (1987): 171–87. For Nicholson, "it is not malice, rancour, power-lust, or vengeance that marks the moral and political character of [Heidegger's] intervention. . . . Heidegger was betrayed by *hybris* that his mere words could transform National Socialism" (p. 185). I have not to date seen any argument that controverts this analysis. See too George Kovacs, "On Heidegger's Silence," *Heidegger Studies* 5 (1989): 135–51; and for an interesting historical reading of both the circumstances of the *Rektoratsrede* and Heidegger's trajectory of Nazi involvement, developed in opposition to Hugo Ott's interpretation in *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1988), see the lecture by Ott's University of Freiburg colleague, the philosopher H. Tietjen, "Martin Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit der Nationalsozialistischen Hochschulpolitik und Wissenschaftsidee," delivered in Budapest and, in a shortened English version, at Yale University in fall 1989. The lecture is part of a work in progress.
4. Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" (abbreviated "NL"), *On the Way to Language*, 57–108, p. 71.
5. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 24; abbreviated "BT."

6. For Heidegger, such inquiry has as its guide that which “is asked about . . . that which is interrogated . . . and that which is to be found out by the asking.” NL 75.
7. Inquiry reaches its term when the question of Heidegger’s silence has been posed and thought as a question. Authentic questioning seeks for what is to be found out by the asking. The problematic or inauthentic question has this information implicitly or analytically in advance and asks for a legitimation or demands a justification. Because what is to be found out by the asking is already given, the question is itself questionable.
8. See Heidegger’s discussion of the possibility of discourse as “*keeping silent*,” BT 204–8. Heidegger holds that “speaking at length” (*Viel-sprechen*) is the best way of covering something up, bringing “what is understood to a sham clarity” (p. 208). On the other hand, he submits that “in talking with another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words” (p. 208). Thus “*keeping silent* is [an] essential possibility of discourse.” Heidegger’s later reflections on language continue the spirit of this distinction.
9. Thus, so far from being an utter silence, Heidegger’s silence has quite literally said volumes to us, without of course revealing itself, and producing in response a stream of books, articles, parentheses, and disjunctive footnotes. Heidegger recognized this phenomenon as the origin of language not as a “phonetic-acoustic-physiological” event but as the “ringing stillness” (WL 121, 122). Thus: “A man may speak, speak endlessly, and all the time say nothing. Another man may remain silent, not speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a great deal” (WL 122). My purpose in this paper is to draw out the communicative difference of this latter reticence because it characterizes the spirit of Heidegger’s thought on language from the start. See BT 204–8.
10. Thus, when Victor Farias’s *Heidegger et le Nazisme* (1987) first began to cause a stir in literary publications in the English-speaking world, another student of Heidegger’s, Professor Elisabeth Hirsch, was moved to write a clarifying letter to the *New York Times* (March 2, 1988). Hirsch reported a continuing context of deep concern on Heidegger’s part, not the unrepentant Nazism attributed to him, and recalled that she had asked him to give an account of his Nazi past. Heidegger, she said, agreed that something needed to be said, “—Aber wie?” *But how?* From the privileged report of a student and a friend, Heidegger’s silence can be approached, if not ever resolved, as testifying to the reticent provisionality of the impossibility of language.
11. See Martin Heidegger, “‘Only a God Can Save Us’: The *Spiegel* Interview (1966),” trans. William J. Richardson, in Thomas Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 45–67 (abbreviated “OG”), p. 62: “No single man, no group of men, no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders

of commerce and industry can brake or direct the progress of history." Compare this with Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. J. Anderson and E. H. Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 52, 55; originally published as *Gelassenheit* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 20, 23. See also Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. J. Sallis, *Basic Writings* (abbreviated "BW"), ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 117-41, esp. pp. 131-32; and so on.

12. In the poverty of this reticence, "thinking is what it is according to its essential origin." Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" (abbreviated "LH"), BW 193-242, p. 196.

13. By such "simulacra of the Western world" I refer to the third world, as well as the "fourth," "fifth," and however many other subaltern and secondary worlds.

14. For the first quote see Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger's Silence: Excerpts from a Talk Given on 5 February 1988," in G. Neske and E. Kettering, eds., *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, trans. L. Harries and J. Neugroschel (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 145-48, p. 148. The original text was part of a colloquium on Heidegger's thought held in Heidelberg, with Hans-Georg Gadamer and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, February 5, 1988. The second quote is from the title of Emmanuel Levinas, "As If Consenting to Horror," trans. Paula Wissing, *Critical Inquiry* 15 (1988-89): 485-88, p. 485; abbreviated "AI."

15. See Reiner Schürmann's distinction between principal (archic) and an-archic thought: *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*, trans. Christine-Marie Gros (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1987), 13; abbreviated "HB."

16. If we do not wish to follow the path of Heidegger's questioning, we must at least be able to limn its direction so that we know what we foreclose in our own way. As Reiner Schürmann shows, the question of the relevance of Heidegger's thought for action, that is, practical and political world-historical engagement, requires a reappropriation of Heidegger's thought, because anything short of this does not address the question of practical responsibility in a time of faltering principles; see HB, esp. parts 1 and 4.

17. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 551; abbreviated "HTP."

18. Note then that the silence of the body, like the silences of animal beings, is not to be thought as a wordless silence. Although animals lack a language, Heidegger does note that "they are not thereby suspended wordlessly in their environment": LH 206.

19. Jürgen Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective," *Critical Inquiry* 15 (1988-89): 431-56, p. 449.

20. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Why I Am So Wise," *Ecce Homo*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Randon House, 1969), 223. See too Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 30.

21. Martin Heidegger, "Vorwort": "Aber I wird nur möglich wenn es im II erhalten ist." In HTP xxiii-xxiii.

22. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "Neither an Accident nor a Mistake," trans. Paula Wissing, *Critical Inquiry* 15 (1988-89): 481-84, p. 482; abbreviated "NA."

23. Martin Heidegger, quoted in Wolfgang Schirmacher, *Technik und Gelassenheit* (Freiburg: Alber, 1983), 25. Schirmacher refers to page 4 of a then-unpublished text of Heidegger's "Das Ge-stell." Schirmacher's context does not approximate Levinas's nor indeed that of Lacoue-Labarthe. For Schirmacher, the problem at hand is the danger of technology, that is, understood in its essence: "Zur Beherrschung jedoch waren wir niemals in der Lage und keine Technologie wird uns dies in Zukunft ermöglichen" (p. 24). For the further context of this quote, Schirmacher precedes its introduction with another citation from another unpublished text, "Gefahr," where Heidegger characterizes the victims of the Holocaust as so many "Bestandstücke eines Bestands der Fabrikation von Leichen" (p. 25). A more comprehensive reading of these texts is offered by Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1987); originally *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983). The "Ackerbau" passage is quoted in AI 487 and in Arnold Davidson (citing Lacoue-Labarthe but giving this same source), "Questions concerning Heidegger: Opening the Debate," *Critical Inquiry* 15 (1988-89): 407-26, p. 423.

24. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, Or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (1984): 53-92.

25. It is however significant, following the suggestion of Isaac Bashevis Singer in just this connection, that from the perspective of animals "we are all Nazis." See "The Slaughterer," *The Animals' Voice Magazine* 2 (1989): 38-41.

26. I have included the German words because if we hear this in the German, its significance is compelling (although it may yet remain, in another sense, "beyond commentary"). The original text is as follows: "Sein erst gewährt dem Heilen Anfang in Huld und Andrang zu Unheil dem Grimm." Martin Heidegger, "Brief über dem Humanismus," *Wegmarken GA 9* (1978), 313-64, p. 357.

27. Martin Heidegger, "The Turning" (abbreviated "TU") in *The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 36-49, p. 42; collection abbreviated "QC."

28. Martin Heidegger, "The Question concerning Technology," QC 3-35, p. 33.
29. Heidegger, "Question concerning Technology," 31. See also Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, 53.
30. Martin Heidegger, "Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being," *Nietzsche*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell, vol. 4 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 197-250, p. 245, translation slightly altered; abbreviated "NI." Compare Heidegger, "Die Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus," *Nietzsche*, 2t. Bd. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 335-98, p. 392.
31. Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, *Heidegger and Modernity*, trans. F. Philip (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), 108; abbreviated "HM." Originally published as *Heidegger et les Modernes* (Paris: Grasset, 1988).
32. Russell Berman and Paul Piccone, "Hidden Agendas: The Young Heidegger and the Post-Modern Debate," *Telos* 17 (1988): 117-25, claim that the continuing impetus for the "Heidegger debate" turns on the spurious "necessary connection between Heidegger's Nazi politics, his philosophy and, *ipso facto*, post-modernism and deconstruction" (p. 119).
33. "Not only is it necessary to represent, but one must also calculate, 'estimate' in advance the represented quanta and the quanta of the representatives. This is the very definition of economic knowledge." Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and 'the Jews'* trans. A. Michel and M. S. Roberts (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1990), 40-41.
34. If only for this reason alone, the postmodern is not merely the elliptical fancy of a new rage. It will not do to convert the "post" of the postmodern into an anti- or amodernity. The implication of transit, of a passage through modernity is essential, for this the contemporary condition is characterized by nothing so much as a history, with all its effects, of being modern.
35. When Adorno and Horkheimer observe, "There are no more anti-Semites," they are asserting that anti-Semitic "psychology has been replaced by mere acceptance of the whole Fascist ticket, the slogans of aggressive big business." *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), 200-201.
36. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 253-64, p. 255.
37. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), 91.