Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our style of painting arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian, for instance.) Is it a mere question of pleasing and ugly?

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Philosophical Investigations, p.230

It may perhaps seem pedantic to begin an examination of this topic by pointing out the perennial place accorded to humanity vis-à-vis other objects[1] located in the kosmos.[2] The Protagorean “man is the measure of all things” (pardon the lack of inclusive language) could, in essence, serve as the moniker for the ‘obvious’ positioning of the human person atop any possible hierarchy of nature based on a number of observable characteristics, i.e. the use of reason, tool-making ability, language capabilities, etc. It seems that any number of possible (uniquely?) human characteristics may serve as the foundation or justification for a particular stance taken with respect to the question, a stance adopted even before the positing of the question in explicit terms, one might add. This is so simply because any human person positing such a question has, quite beforehand and implicitly if not explicitly, settled into a particular stance toward the world in which one finds oneself.

At this point, of course, room for debate appears on the horizon of inquiry concerning what has been termed an ‘anthropocentric bias.’[3] Suffice it to say at this stage in the investigation that what is being stated is the simple fact that all human beings find themselves in a world not of their choosing, and as such seek (or are given), whether by choice or circumstance, some place from which it is possible to make sense of this unasked for situation. One could make the claim that such an enterprise is doomed from the start, even given the following provision (i.e. the reduction of the issue to one of minimal existential consideration). This objection, however, is not a concern for this paper, for in noting that the history of the ‘problem’ of ‘place’ is typically addressed along anthropocentric lines does not necessarily entail that such a vantage point is incorrect or inherently flawed. Such a ‘bias’ is not terribly problematic for the simple reason that it is not entirely clear from what other perspective one is entitled to (or available for) a given investigation. Knowledge must operate from within some frame of reference, and it does not seem problematic to begin an inquiry from the frame of reference that one happens to occupy.

The question of ‘place,’ however, does involve more than this point. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the context of discussing definitions as they arise in the field of mathematics, offers this point:

Suppose I say, “Every patch fits exactly with its background” instead of “Everything is the same as itself.” “This chalkmark fits exactly into its surroundings.”—Then I am talking as if there were a hole into which I had fitted the chalkmark, or as if the chalk were surrounded by a glass case into which it fitted.—But we can talk of a piece of ice fitting into a glass, not of water fitting into a glass.[4]

In other words, Wittgenstein’s point highlights the inherent problems associated with the endeavor to find the ‘place’ of anything, for such language seems to betray a reliance on a general notion that all things have their place, i.e. that objects are marked off by some fixed and predetermined boundary of logical necessity. That forms the basis for his point in noting that we can talk of ice fitting into a glass (i.e. we put pieces of ice into glasses, we have a use for this particular expression), but this does not imply that ice is logically or necessarily fitted into such a locale (at the expense of other locales), nor does it imply that ice is ‘at home’ in a glass or ‘naturally’ located in such a place.[5] Thus, if one is to posit an answer concerning humanity’s ‘place’ in the kosmos, this can only occur after careful attention is paid to the kind of place one is talking about and how one is using such expressions.

1. Topos and Value[6]

It can surely be argued that the place in which one stands (possibly) presents a problem for claiming that locating humanity within the kosmos is at root a question of value. A case could be made denoting one’s location as definitive enough to offer some basis for ‘objectivity;’ the visual field, for instance, is precisely dependent upon spatial location and orientation. A change of location will, by necessity, entail a change in the visual field. This point, however, does not present itself as a formidable counter-argument, for it does not afford one with the type of ‘objective’ basis required for making ontological or metaphysical claims regarding the placement of the human person within a recognized world ‘order.’ It cannot do this kind of work because the question itself, i.e. the location of the human person within a sphere of identifiable objects, is a question involving preference and not merely one of recognition or discovery of a kind of placement ready to hand, so to speak.[7] This does not mean, however, that the human person cannot make credible observations concerning notable differences between the type of creature it is and the other kinds of creatures that it encounters. In essence, an array of data can be gathered under various headings, for example, a list compiled according to observed behavior. This sort of procedure, however, is fairly innocuous. What betrays a reliance on value is the move that is made from mere compilation of data to assigning various weights to the data thus compiled. Inevitably a hierarchy is established (or, if not a hierarchy, at least a preference for some details and lack of inclusion for others), with some information ‘taking on’ significance beyond its mere reception. The question, then, of humanity’s ‘place’ inevitably involves a reliance upon some agreed upon definition of what it means to be a member of a particular class of objects, in this case what it means to be human. Such an enterprise entails the need to make choices, for one intent on defining the human person must choose from an available array of features and settle upon one (or some privileged group), which in turn raises the result to the status of the salient feature or the defining characteristic. But, and this is likewise important, such a choice rests on entirely arbitrary grounds.[8]

It is important, especially in light of such a claim, to understand that the grounds for choosing one set of characteristics over and above an array of available characteristics warrants the distinction of being called arbitrary. It is not the case that the characteristic itself is called into question in the least; what is considered arbitrary (on this view) is the import or significance accorded to the characteristic itself. It is one thing to note that something is or is not the case, and quite another to use this observation in search of some ‘deeper’ significance or as a justification for some further point, argument, etc.[9] In essence, such a move from observation to grounds for justification amounts to reinstating the observed phenomenon into a very different light and casts for it a role as standing for something other than what it actually is on its own terms. This forms the basis for describing this entire enterprise as one involving value and not ontology. The move from simple observation to the transformation of the phenomenon into some basis serving to justify a position (definition, argument) ‘drawn’ from (or read into) the observation is really a move that betrays its dependence on prior conceptions of value.[10] This is so because the basis for such a choice (and such a basis is always offered in the form of some argument or other, whether explicitly or implicitly) may seem entirely clear and ‘self-evident’ to the one offering it, but appeals to ‘self-evidence’ entail little more than a fiat chosen (or accepted) in advance. In other words, the act of choosing one set of characteristics or features over and against another is entirely dependent upon the value that is seen (or recognized) in choosing one set of characteristics or observations over and against another. Value is at work in this enterprise because, quite simply, appeal must ultimately be made to the standard that is employed as a guide to the choice, and any standard thus employed involves the explicit or implicit recognition that one is in fact operating from a particular standpoint or frame of reference that is the privileged one.

This indicates that the issue involves topos (place) from the very outset, not so much as a question of determining the grounds for justification as it is a question of perspective and orientation. This, on the face of it, is not a very dramatic a point to make; the consequence of what follows from such an understanding, however, is significant. As a speaker (or writer, philosopher, etc.) one ultimately addresses some audience from a particular standpoint concerning some topic or other. Yet, and this is the problematic point, at some point in the dialogue (or argument) the position ceases to be merely my opinion and becomes, in fact, an assertion concerning some state of affairs. It becomes a point of possible dispute about some ‘x’ or some ‘y’ for the reason that the assertion is capable of bearing truth claims. In essence, a determinate stand has been made. Opinion or viewpoint shifts to authoritative proclamation, and it is this shift that is a central concern. Now, this issue does not necessarily present itself as deeply problematic in various disciplines, especially where the boundaries of discourse may be articulated in such a way that the demarcation from my view to the accepted or authoritative view is public knowledge and fairly obvious.[11] In other words, certain lines of inquiry are fairly well established and follow a definite course that must be followed in order to further the fund of knowledge for some particular field.[12] However, and this is significant for the task at hand, this is not the case when one is faced with what may be termed ‘philosophical’ questions.[13] A question involving humanity’s ‘place’ in the kosmos, at least as it is addressed in the present discussion, is not a simple question of taxonomy (i.e. of placing the human being within some classificatory scheme along with other objects). It is, rather, an investigation that must be conceived along topographical lines directly related to considerations of value.[14]

It is on this point that one can note the dependence on topos inherent in considerations of value. Various stances have been taken in the past and will remain to be taken in the future, and human beings are quite at liberty to choose from among this array of ‘solutions’ whichever one seems to resonate with their own outlook, experience, world-view, etc.[15] Agreement seems, after all, to depend much more on local conditions and factors and not upon some ‘transcendent’ exercise of ‘cold’ reason.[16] Local conditions (culture, training, language, etc.) certainly color the ways in which one may perceive the world, and for this reason the issue involves the values and aesthetic sensibilities that one inevitably encounters there rather than any observed phenomenon defacto. This issue, however, involves more than this. The local topography sets the boundaries of discourse by establishing, within any particular sphere, exactly what constitutes legitimate norms for discussion, i.e. by delimiting relevant topics and the lines for clarification, agreement or argument. Thus, one can see that it is not a simple matter of ‘subjectivism’ versus ‘objectivism,’ for such a conception is at once both an oversimplification of the issue and quite simply to miss the point as well. Such terms essentially communicate nothing, and serve to mask the real issue beneath a shade of meanings none of which are stable or enlightening.

2. Topoi and ‘Thought Communities’

It may appear that this paper has dodged the central issue of the topic, namely, to talk about the place that humanity occupies in the kosmos. Perhaps the charge carries some weight when viewed from particular quarters, i.e. when viewed from a certain aspect or under certain expectations. This, of course, is exactly the point of the paper. It is not an exercise in deconstruction intent on analyzing the question or problem in such a way that the central issue disappears. Rather, it is the intention of this paper to highlight the background conditions that 1) are responsible for framing particular questions at all, i.e. questions seen as deserving some answer, and 2) the expectations that arise from this situation where particular concerns are valued over others. This leads us inexorably into a discussion of the central feature of a local topography, the communities of tradition responsible for shaping the values operative in a given region.[17]

Words only have meaning when they operate in a particular context. For a word to have import, it must first of all be recognized as bearing a particular meaning or shade of meaning that can be publicly recognized; meaning must rely on shared understandings. Here, of course, the issue of topos can be seen as serving a primary role, for one comes to learn value and meaning from within a particular environment and language community. This relates to the present discussion because, as I have been trying to point out, even the framing of the question is dependent upon the place in which one finds oneself. And the framing of the question is significant because it carries within itself (so to speak) the trajectories for all the possible ‘answers’ that may be offered. This is the case because an answer to a question can only be recognized as such according to the guidelines of a particular ‘thought community’ which determine the legitimacy of certain positions over and against others.[18] This highlights, to a certain degree, one factor at work in determining the boundaries of a particular topos, i.e. the standards of value operative and the role of authority in maintaining and propagating them.[19]

What has begun as an exploration concerning the type of question asked concerning humanity’s ‘place’ has yielded an interesting result. It is deeply problematic to posit a single ‘place’ for humanity (unless one is interested in taxonomic categories), because human beings occupy various places and operate from within various contexts and perspectives. The lives of human beings are indeed bounded, but the boundaries of their existence are, for the most part, linguistic in nature.[20] As José Ortega y Gasset points out,

each life is submerged in a specific environment of a collective life. And this collective life, this anonymous life in which each of us finds himself also has its world, its repertory of convictions, of which, whether he likes it or not, the individual must take account.[21]

The human being does not occupy one kosmos (strictly speaking, of course, this is the case, but only if viewed from a merely biological point of view), but rather, humans occupy various kosmoi. The topos in which one finds oneself is indeed the kosmos for that individual. And, unless this individual encounters other people from different backgrounds, this will indeed be the only kosmos for that person for, quite simply, it will be the only world that the person knows or of which he or she has experience.

We are not interested in a consideration of the existence of some abstract human being existing within some cosmological totality per se, for such a consideration does not touch on human living at all.[22] Quite simply, humans do not simply find themselves in the world with ready-made solutions at hand. Human existence involves a complex linguistic dimension which, for this reason alone, propels human beings out of a merely biological form of life.[23] The style of life encountered in a particular locale is absolutely dependent upon such a fact, for the various humans that comprise such a topos must first of all be taught (or trained) to recognize the boundaries of their particular existence.[24] In other words, in order for these humans to become full-fledged members of the particular community to which they are born (or to which they come in order to join), they must come to see the world in which they live from a particular perspective, i.e. the perspective of the community. As Ortega y Gasset notes, “the world and our convictions about the world make up our sense of direction, orient us, give us the compass points which direct our actions.”[25] The meaning of one’s world is dependent upon having received such training (or reacting against such received notions), and this, more than anything else, forms what may be termed the ‘horizon of expectation.’[26]

3. Topographical Limits

The limits of one’s world are indeed the limits of the particular community in which one finds oneself. These are not necessarily the only limits to human living, insofar as any individual can indeed explore and probe the boundaries of meaning by beginning to question the horizon of expectation operative in their own experience of the world. Such background expectations form the basis for stating that certain positions are ‘self evident,’ the self evidence lying not in the logical arrangement of the topic but rather, residing with the individual for whom the question of a question has not presented itself. For Fleck, such a horizon is

coercion of the strongest kind, because it appears in the guise of a self-evident necessity and is thus not even recognized as a coercive force. And woe to the true believer who does not or cannot conform. She feels cast out and branded, because she knows full well that every fellow of the collective immediately notices her act of treason.[27]

The boundaries of meaning which one has come to learn can be a coercive force of the strongest kind, quite simply because such boundaries determine for the individual the ‘acceptable’ lines of inquiry and the only possible ‘relevant’ outcomes of such an enterprise. Thus, as Foucault has noted, “the necessity of excavating our own culture in order to open a free space for innovation and creativity” is necessary, not just as a standpoint for his own enterprise but, for all who would want to come to a fuller understanding of the ‘place’ in which one finds oneself.[28] It forms, then, a challenge to any human being intent on coming to a deeper understanding of the relationship between the lives we lead and the place in which we live, and it has been the aim of this paper to do just that.

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[1] The use of the word ‘object’ should not be understood as betraying a philosophical bias of any kind, i.e. this word, as far as I’m concerned, is synonymous with that of ‘thing.’ I simply prefer this word because the word ‘thing’ seems to carry with it some unwanted metaphysical baggage.

[2] The Greek form of the word will be used throughout this paper. The reason for this usage lies at the heart of the thesis to be elaborated here, namely, that a ‘logical’ relation exists between prior considerations and subsequent results for any process of inquiry. It is this relation, especially as it is tempered by local conditions and background assumptions, that forms the core of this paper.

[3] This critique, it seems to me, forms the central argument against ‘traditional’ ethics offered from the standpoint of process philosophy.

[4] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, ed. Cora Diamond (U of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1975) 27. It is important to note that Wittgenstein was not the author of this text, as it is formed from the notes of four different people who attended the series of lectures.

[5] It is interesting how quickly the move is made from locating the ‘place’ of an object amidst a constellation of others, and determining that such a place is the ‘natural’ location for it. Once this has been established, of course, the place for an object takes on ethical overtones. The implications for such a move, however, lie outside the scope of this paper.

[6] The Greek word ‘topos’ means place. It serves as a useful juxtaposition with the word ‘kosmos.’

[7] This point is made by Wittgenstein when he offers an account of mathematical proofs, noting that “We fix whether there is to be only one proof of a certain proposition, or two proofs, or many proofs. For everything depends on what we call a proof.” Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 39.

[8] On this point one may charge that the account offered here rests on similar grounds, which therefore seems to invalidate what has been presented thus far. This, however, does not offer itself as a valid counter-argument, if only on the grounds that one may be aware of one’s own ‘arbitrary’ starting point while still being entitled to offer a critique against those who are not aware of this matter as far as their position is concerned. More is at work, however, in this case. The arbitrariness referred to in this context involves the basis for choosing one element (or a select few) out of an array of many, as the observed characteristics do not on their own determine their own meaning or significance. This point will be further elaborated in some detail.

[9] It may be argued that such a position seems to discount or dismiss the veracity of scientific claims. Such is not necessarily the case, although it is not always clear, as far as the sciences are concerned, when one is dealing with an operational definition or one that is offered as the synthesis of some truth claim; i.e. to what extent instrumental views are dominant in a particular field.

[10] In other words, one’s point of view is certainly operative, not just in the analysis of a given situation, but in the perception of it as well, i.e. there is no experience of ‘pure’ perception at all.

[11] This point does not depend on the over-generalized distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ viewpoints at all, as will hopefully become clear as the discussion unfolds.

[12] This does not imply nor depend on ‘logical necessity,’ but rather, on what may be termed ‘communally recognized boundaries of meaning.’ This point will be addressed in the second section of the paper.

[13] This is a debatable point, and one of which I am aware. I will address this issue in more detail in the second part of the paper.

[14] I am not interested in ‘metaphysical’ considerations of the question for reasons that will hopefully be clear as the investigation is carried forward in the text. The reasons for claiming that this question is ultimately founded upon a question of value will likewise unfold in the present discussion.

[15] Of course, the possibilities that one may choose from are themselves dependent upon the topos in which one happens to be. In other words, the array of possibilities themselves will be limited by the local conditions in which one finds oneself.

[16] This point warrants a much fuller treatment. The issue involves what Michel Foucault has noted concerning the relationship between tradition and ‘universal necessities.’ He states that “a lot of things that are a part of their landscape—that people think are universal—are the result of some very precise historical changes.” Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, ed. Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (U. of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1988) 11.

[17] As Michel Foucault notes, “the way people act or react is linked to a way of thinking, and of course thinking is related to tradition.” 14.

[18] Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, eds. Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton, trans. Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn (U of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1979). The term, as it is used here, is a hybrid based on Fleck’s notion of “thought collectives,” which he defines as “a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction,” p. 39. I have broadened the scope of Fleck’s notion by having it encompass other spheres of human activity, i.e. social and aesthetic interaction as well.

[19] This point of the role of authority brings to the fore the latent ethical dimensions of the topic, and though a fuller exploration of this issue lies outside the scope of this paper, it is a central feature operating at the background of the present discussion.

[20] I’m not denying the real existence of what may be termed ‘metaphysical’ considerations concerning the lives of human beings. These, however, seem to involve the real sciences and not that of philosophical reflection, i.e. such considerations do little than to characterize the kind of being the human is with reference to the classification of other creatures, i.e. such an issue is taxonomic and not philosophic (though one could offer philosophical reflection based upon such considerations, as this paper attempts in part to do).

[21] José Ortega y Gasset, man and crisis, trans. Mildred Adams (W. W. Norton and Co.: New York, 1958) 39.

[22] It could be the case that some human individual has adopted such a grand reference frame from which to perceive one’s existence. On this case it would be legitimate to note that, for this individual at least, he or she does live in one kosmos.

[23] One may object to this point being made in this paper, for as I stated in the introduction, such considerations betray a particular definition of the human being. However, I am not using this observation to further some exclusive view of human living. The only point I am trying to make in this context is the mere fact that complex linguistic ability entails, on its own, a different kind of living, i.e. one that involves dimensions not strictly biological.

[24] This point is implicit in Kuhn’s treatment of “textbook science,” especially when he notes that such texts serve as “pedagogical vehicles for the perpetuation of normal science.” Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U. of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1962) 137. Such manuals of instruction are necessary tools for any community intent of propagating its values to newer generations of initiates.

[25] Ortega y Gasset, 87-88.

[26] Unfortunately, there is not enough time to treat this issue in greater detail, especially as it impacts epistemological considerations.

[27] Fleck, 108.

[28] Foucault, Afterword.