PHGA 6359 Nominalism
Professor Gyula Klima
Spring 2007
Tuesdays, 4:30–6:30

Nominalism, according to the common understanding of the term, is a position on the ontological status of universals. On this understanding, nominalism claims that it is primarily (or even exclusively) words that are universals, as opposed to the two competing theoretical alternatives, namely, conceptualism, according to which the primary universals are concepts, and realism, according to which the primary universals are things. Both historically and theoretically, there are a number of problems with this simple scheme. The analysis of these problems through the works of the most prominent medieval nominalists (in particular, Ockham, Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Peter of Ailly) contrasted with some late-medieval realists (Cajetan, Soto and Suarez) shows that nominalism is not so much a distinctive ontological position (although nominalists as a rule are indeed committed to relatively parsimonious ontologies) as a distinctive way of construing the fundamental relationships between words, concepts and things. Issues covered will include: the problem of universals, common natures and individuation, being and essence, the univocity vs. analogy of being; signification, connotation, supposition, ampliation and ontological commitment; mental language and cognitive attitudes, the semantics of propositions, the objects of knowledge and belief.