PHGA 7357 The Epistemology of Disagreement
Professor Bryan Frances
Fall 2007
Tuesday 7:00–9:00 pm

This course will investigate the interesting epistemological consequences of disagreement, especially philosophical disagreement.  Often we hold a philosophical belief even though we know full well that many contemporary philosophers who believe the opposite are our epistemic peers or even superiors regarding the topics directly relevant to the belief.  This looks epistemically irresponsible.  Shouldn’t I withhold belief or at least reduce my confidence level once I discover that some of my epistemic peers or superiors disagree with my belief?  Can my belief amount to knowledge in this situation?  More generally, what philosophical beliefs are philosophers epistemically blameless in holding?  How should we conduct our philosophical lives?  And what does this mean for religious views?  Can I have epistemically upstanding religious beliefs if I am aware of the many expertly endorsed theistic and atheistic views and am wise enough to know that I am no expert on religious matters?

Almost all of the course readings will be available on-line, as most of them are very recent or are forthcoming (we’re studying a “hot topic”).  So, no text or course packet.  Isn’t that fiscally nice?  There will not be a great deal of reading in this course.  However, I’ll be expecting students to have detailed and deep understanding of the materials we do read.

What appear here are most of the readings for the course (in no order).  We will begin the course by going over some bread-and-butter concepts for epistemology: the relations among knowledge, belief, justification, truth, rationality, and evidence.  Then we’ll get to the main seminar topics.

• Peter van Inwagen, 1996. “Is It Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?” in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, edited by Jordan and Howard-Snyder, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Thomas Kelly, 2006. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, edited by John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler Szabo.
• Richard Feldman, forthcoming. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without God, edited by Louise Antony.
• Richard Feldman, forthcoming. “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement,” in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Hetherington.
• Bryan Frances, 2005. Selected chapters of Scepticism Comes Alive, OUP.
• Bryan Frances, ms. “Who Am I to Disagree with David Lewis?”
• Bryan Frances, forthcoming. “Spiritual Mentality and the Theistic Beliefs of Philosophers”.
• David Christensen, forthcoming. “Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News”, Philosophical Review.
• Roger White, 2005. “Epistemic Permissiveness,” Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 2005.
• Brian Weatherson, ms. “Disagreeing about Disagreement”.
• Adam Elga, ms. “Disagreement and Bootstrapping”.
• Adam Elga, forthcoming. “Reflection and Disagreement”, Noûs.
• David Silver, 2001. “Religious Experience and the Facts of Religious Pluralism” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 49, 1-17.
• Eric Vogelstein, 2004. “Religious Pluralism and Justified Christian Belief: A Reply to Silver” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 55, 187-192.