Philosophical Ethics -- Fall 2000

Midterm Exam Review Tips

Plato

-- What set of changes in worldview was underway in Greek culture between the time of Homer and Socrates?

-- What is Socrates's main criticism of Gorgias's practice or oratory or political rhetoric?

-- How does he distinguish between crafts and mere "knacks?" Compare this to MacIntyre's definition of a practice.

-- What position does Polus defend, after stating that Gorgias was too nice to say it?

-- What is Socrates's main point against Polus? Why does he think, contrary to appearances, that injustice can never benefit us?

-- What forms of egoism does Callicles defend, and what is Socrates's critique of them?

Aristotle

-- How would Aristotle respond to Callicles claim that what makes one fit to lead and to attain happiness is bravery, self-assertiveness, and desire for honor?

-- What does Aristotle think there must be one encompassing end or goal of human life? Is he right?

-- How does Aristotle think we can tell what our natural purpose/function/design plan is, and hence what form of life will make us happiest?

-- Aristotle describes a virtue as a complex "state" of motivation or disposition to act in certain ways. What are the components of such a disposition?

-- Why does Aristotle think that virtuous tendencies or states can only be attained by training or habituation? What distinguishes this process from training an animal by rote to react as desired to some stimulus, or training a child by repeated drilling to memorize some concepts?

-- Why does Aristotle think we cannot explain virtue simply in terms of following a short list of moral rules of good conduct?

-- How does Aristotle explain bravery, temperance, and generosity?

-- In his account of magnificence and magnaminity, Aristotle discourages us from seeing honor and public esteem won through displays of wealth and donations for public works as the proper aim of a gentleman. His great-souled or magnanimous person has self-respect based on a sense of his own decency that is largely independent of popular opinion. Is he right to think of this as proper pride, or does he not take enough account of the need for humility? Does his account of magnaminity explain the kind of "self-love" he thinks is a prerequisite for being a good friend?

-- Is Aristotle right that being a friend (in the complete sense) is a virtue?

-- How does he distinguish the three main kinds of friendship?

-- Why is the complete friendship, in which we love the other for their virtuous personality, more stable and lasting than other kinds?

-- Why is friendship in the complete sense contrary to egoism? Yet how does Aristotle nevertheless think it is related to self-love?

MacIntyre

• -How does MacIntyre explain his notion of practices?
• -For MacIntyre, there are two kinds of goods "internal" to practices: (a) those non-self-interested goods we pursue for their own sake when we engage in the practice, and (b) the experience and satisfaction we derive from pursuing the (a) goods for their own sake. Relate this to Feinberg's notion of pleasure as a byproduct of pursuing benevolent ends/goals.
• -Why does MacIntyre think that several basic virtues are required if we are to be able to cooperate with others effectively in pursuing the goals that define the practices, and striving to meet the standards of excellence each practice sets for its field?
• -Is he right that practices understood as a vocation in which we can express our creative power, strive for excellence, and develop our talents in useful work is an essential part of what makes life fulfilling?
• -Could we think of the art of cultivating lasting friendships as a "practice" in Mac's sense?

Feinberg

• Feinberg says that psychological egoism is a "synthetic" rather than an "analytic" claim, meaning that it is not a logical truism like "all batchelors are unmarried." Thus it can't be true by definition that doing what I desire or want to do = acting on a self-interested motive. Rather, only pursuing certain ends -those related to our own well-being- is self-interested. How does this answer the first argument for egoism (a)?

• How does Feinberg answer the second argument for egoism's claim that if we derive pleasure from helping someone else, then this satisfaction must be part of our motive for the act, making it self-interested after all?
• What is the "paradox of hedonism" Feinberg describes? Does this show that the sort of abstract happiness or satisfaction the hedonist seeks can only be gained through pursuing other things for their own sake? What kinds of things? (Relate this to MacIntyre on practices and Aristotle on the virtues).

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