Philosophical Ethics, Fall 2000

Final Exam Review Notes

These review notes constitute a very brief guide, just to give you examples of the sort of thing you should study (so questions about things not specifically mentioned here are fair game!). The notes begin with Hobbes, but the exam is cumulative, and likely to include questions comparing thinkers we studied later in the semester with those studied earlier. Multiple choice questions might also relate to MacIntyre and Feinberg, although you are unlikely to get multiple choice questions just on Plato or Aristotle by themselves.

The exam is open book/open note, but do not put quotes in your answers, and you should not try to prepare answers you can simply copy during the exam. The questions cannot be exactly anticipated. The best thing is to have a good sense of the main points from each author, and be able to apply them.

Thomas Hobbes

• Think about how Hobbes's account of the will in On Man differs from Kant's conception of our will as a power of practical rationality that can evaluate final ends or goal of action.
• Why does Hobbes think our use of moral language is relative to each person's desires? How does this differ from Kant's argument in the Preface of the Groundwork (and later) that we understand our moral judgments to apply to all persons (or beings with the freedom and rationality necessary to count as responsible for themselves)
• In On Man ch.IX, what sorts of goods does Hobbes argue we all desire, and how does he explain on this basis: (a) friendships, (b) pursuit of arts and sciences, (c) cruelty, (d) music and poety, (e) courage.
• How does Hobbes's account of self-confidence compare and contrast with Aristotle on magnanimity?
• In On Man ch.X, how does Hobbes trace our emotions to competitive desires for ascendance over others, or comparative superiority?
• How does he explain grief and compassion? Why does he, like Aristotle, admire balanced or moderate emotions?
• In his dedicatory letter to his patron (the Earl of Devonshire) at the beginning of The Citizen, why does Hobbes think a kind of 'moral geometry' will bring us lasting peace?
• In his Preface to The Citizen, how does Hobbes argue that we are not wicked by nature, even though we have to agree to a common ruler by contract to avoid a war of all against all?
• Aristotle though a good polis was a city that would bring us happiness by teaching us the virtues and giving us friends, works, and public service as opportunities to actively employ the virtues. How does Hobbes's analysis of the purpose or function of society in securing happiness differ from this?
• In his analysis of the state of nature, Hobbes distinguishes three initial causes of violence: competition for scarce resources, the absence of any natural dominance of most men by a few (physical equality), and the desire for honor, glory, or competitive distinction for its own sake (which is especially strong in some, i.e. the fiery or vainglorious). Combined, these initial causes result in an unstable situation in which no defense will be enough to gain the security we desire, and so a new derivative motive for offensive violence results when groups try to expand their rule by force over a greater territory, in quest for more power (the right to invade).
• Hobbes's laws of nature are hypothetical imperatives of prudence in Kant's sense: do what best serves egoistic goals. Our first natural right is the right to self-defense, and this implies or includes a right to all resources we can seize. So it is our natural right not to recognize any property distinctions (or any other moral duties) in the state of nature. But the analysis of this state itself, as collectively self-defeating, shows us that we ought to seek peace by contract when others are willing (or can be forced) to set up a mutual sovereign over us to enforce the peace.
• What two laws of nature does Hobbes derive (in The Citizen ch.II) from this analysis of natural right?
• An interesting problem: Hobbes argues that contracts are void if they are not thought by all parties to be reliably enforced. So contracts are valid only because a sovereign exists to enforce them. But the initial social contract creates the sovereign. The sovereign only has the power to enforce it if enough people abide by it. But then our duty to abide by it long enough for the sovereign to gain the power to enforce it would seem to require faith that others will do likewise. This can't be just because of the desire for peace they share with us. For we know that unless they are forced to abide by the contract, the option of gaining extra advantage by breaking it will be more rational (as in the Prisoner's dilemma). And they know this about us too, and we know they know it, etc. Would this show that it would be irrational for an egoist to agree in the beginning to live by the social contract, not knowing if (enough) others will too? What would Peter Singer say about this?

Immanuel Kant

• Why in his Preface does Kant think we need to work out a "pure" moral philosophy, whose foundation does not depend on human psychology, and whose laws can be known "a priori," or without empirical experience (such as particular desires or impulses)?
• Why does Kant think this clarification of the basis of morality will help us act for the sake of the moral law, rather than just conforming to it? Look at the first few pages of Groundwork II for this issue, as well as the Preface.
• Why, according to Groundwork I, is the good will the only unconditionally good feature of a human character?
• Both Kant and Aristotle think that moral virtue involves acting out of (or on the motive of) one's sense of what is noble, righteous, or dutiful. What is the main difference between their account of morality's role within our lives? (think here about the relation of morality to happiness in their accounts).
• Kant thinks our ordinary moral beliefs have at their center the concept of duty. He also thinks we commonly distinguish between acting for the sake of duty, and acting on other motives. What other motives does he contrast with duty as a "ground" for adopting one's maxims (or for pursuing various ends) in his famous four examples in Groundwork I?
• Is Kant right to argue that a sense of its moral rightness is the only motive we recognize as giving an action its unconditional goodness? Should we think of the good will this way? What would Mill say in response to this?
• Kant's first formulation of his supreme principle says that we ought never to choose a maxim or action-plan unless it is universalizable. Why does he think lying at will (whenever it serves us) is not universalizable, for example?
• In Groundwork II he breaks this down into two parts: some wrong act-maxims cannot be universalized at all; acts that violate other moral duties could be universalized, but we could not rationally will their universalization. The former violate strict principles we ought never to infringe, whatever the consequences for Kant. The latter violate open-ended duties to promote the well-being of others and ourselves, which we ought to fulfill when we can (but never by violating strict duties). Think about his examples and others to see where they fit here.
• -- For instance, through nepotism, we'd be helping our relatives find employment. Would this fulfill our duties or violate them, according to Kant's logic?
• - What if we (with our cell-phone, in no particular hurry anywhere) passed by just as a person wasbeing mugged, and we did nothing to try to help them? (Remember the Seinfeld episode?)
• How does Kant explain the moral perspective embodied in the categorical imperative as one in which we are impartial, or avoid making an exception of ourselves or our significant others?
• How does Kant argue, near the beginning of Groundwork II, that our obligations aren't simply determined by God's decrees, since God's acts are also under the moral law?
• How does Kant distinguish hypothetical from categorical imperatives in Groundwork II? Why does he think hypothetical imperatives of prudence don't provide enough guidance for a morally righteous life?
• Since morally worthy action is not a means to happiness, but an end in itself for Kant, he thinks the principle commanding it must be a categorical imperative. But since every act must have some end/goal with intrinsic value, he says moral action must have an end, but it must be something whose intrinsic value is unconditional, or always present for all rational beings capable of moral action. This end is rational will or personhood itself.
• Why does Kant think we are all implicitly committed to the idea that as persons, we have an intrinsic value that any other responsible being should recognize, whether or not we satisfy any of their desires or otherwise serve their ends? How does this lead to his new formulation of the categorical imperative in terms of humanity as an end-in-itself?
• How does Kant base his conception of human rights on this principle requiring us not to treat others merely as means, or in ways to which they cannot rationally consent? Is this a sound basis for a doctrine of universal human rights? Is it a better ground than Mill can offer on the basis that liberties protecting the dignity of each individual will be part of the social structure that maximizes total happiness?

John Stuart Mill

• Why does Mill think we need a basic rational principle of ethics, which requires us to go beyond what intuitive judgment or moral sense tells us about particular cases?
• What is Mill's objection to Kant in Utilitarianism I? Is it right? If not, why not?
• What is the greatest happiness principle that Mill defends in Utilitarianism II? How does the distinction of lower pleasures from higher pleasures -including dignity, tranquility, and excitement- help Mill answer the 'banality' objection, i.e. that utilitarianism would lead to maximum universal hedonism of the basest sort for all?
• Why does Mill think the right set of social reforms and scientific initiatives can lead to a life of much happiness and little misery for all human beings? Give examples.
• How does Mill distinguish between the motive behind an action and what makes the action right or morally admirable? What does this lead him to say about the sacrifices of moral heros? What would Kant say in response?
• What kind of impartiality is built into Mill's principle? What sort of motives does it require other than egoistic ones? How does Mill argue in Utilitarianism III that such motives are possible for most human beings?
• How does Mill's notion of intermediate precepts -moral principles whose value consists in their helping to maximize total happiness when regularly followed- help answer the objection that utilitarianism requires an impossibly complex calculation from us, and would lead to violating traditional moral precepts whenever we can promote more happiness than harm by violating them? (George Sher's Introduction may help quite a bit with these points).

• How does Mill argue against lying, cheating, stealing, murdering etc. even in cases where it would clearly be expedient for total happiness to do so? What would Bernard Williams says in response to Mill? (see his discussion of the precedent effect).
• Suppose we take seriously Mill's indirect utilitarianism in terms of intermediate principles. Why would Kant say that the moral rightness of following these traditional moral rules or ideals of virtue cannot rest solely in the utility produced by their general observance, as Mill suggests? Hint: if the traditional rules are effective in promoting happiness only because people are taught to think the acts they require are right in themselves, and those they forbid are wrong in themselves, would the moral education necessary to maximize happiness have to involve deception about morality itself, or what really makes acts right or wrong? Would we have to teach folks to follow these rules as categorical imperatives, when really they are hypothetical imperatives?

Bernard Williams

• If a rule forbidding some kind of action was valuable solely because of that sort of act's harmful consequences, we could presumably reformulate that rule into one telling us to minimize instances of that kind of act. Why does Williams think such a consequentialist version of the rule would not necessarily always forbid the relevant kind of act as intrinsically wrong?
• Why does Williams think that if the consequences of following traditional moral precepts were crazy or extreme enough, our moral ideas don't apply (or we simply have no rational answer to the problem)? See the first few pages of his article.
• Why does Williams think that utilitarianism makes us responsible for others' actions in an inappropriate way, contrary to the idea that our primary responsibility is for our own acts?
• Why would Williams say that Mill's view requires too much altruism from us, and too little concern for our own principles, projects, commitments, and relationships? Why does he think this is incompatible with personal integrity?