Midterm Exam Answers to Multiple Choice

1. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that oratory or political rhetoric as Gorgias teaches it is only a "knack," only an image of the true craft of political science, because

(a) It can be used for good or corrupt purposes, depending on whether the practitioner has a sense of justice or not.

(b) The orator cannot be as effective as genuine experts with knowledge of what is best for the state (i.e. the philosopher or true politician) in convincing councils and assemblies in their political decisions.

(c) Oratory as the ability to persuade crowds through long speeches is not as effective in the search for truth as philosophical dialectic, i.e. critical examination of positions to see if they stand up to the test of possible objections.

(d) Oratory aims only to empower the oratory to satisfy his own desires through persuasion or the deceptive appearance of knowledge, rather than using knowledge to produce some basic good for the community.

ANSWER: D. He also says A and C but these are not as relevant to the question. He denies B.

2. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues against Polus's claim that the unjust tyrant Archelaus is truly happy. He says the testimony of popular opinion is no proof of this, and argues instead that injustice is an illness of the soul that the harmful to everyone, including the tyrant. Polus is caught in this argument (and later criticized by Callicles) for agreeing with Socrates that

(a) Doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice at another's hands.

(b) What is shameful (the opposite or the admirable or noble) is so either because it is painful or because it is harmful.

(d) Oratory as the ability to persuade crowds through long speeches is not as effective in the search for truth as philosophical dialectic, i.e. critical examination of positions to see if they stand up to the test of possible objections.

ANSWER: A. Polus also agrees to B and C but these are not the problem for him.

3. In Book I of Aristotle's Ethics, he argues that true happiness is not attained mainly through honor, glory, or high social status, because

(a) Honor and fame do not always lead to the material resources and power needed to help one's friends and enjoy a fully happy life.

(b) A person can gain honor or fame from success in war and politics without enjoying very many pleasures, physical satisfactions, amusement and lack of worries in private life.

(c) Honor and status are too dependent on changeable opinions of others, and swings of fortune in one's society, but virtuous character, which merits honor, is more stable.

(d) True friendship is more important than honor, since friendship between people who take joy directly in each other's good character is more satisfying than formal recognition and status in one's society at large.

ANSWER: C. A and B are also true but they are not the main problem with honor for Aristotle. He may also agree with D, but honor is compatible with friendship, so this isn't its main problem as an end or goal.

4. In Ethics Book II, Aristotle argues virtues are "states" concerned with decision that are built up by a process of habituation, or practicing virtuous acts. By this he means that

(a) Virtue is simply the skill of judging rightly what the noble (i.e. just, brave, generous, friendly etc.) thing is to do in our circumstances, which we learn by practice.

(b) Virtues are dispositions to desire what is noble for its own sake, a desire we acquire only through first doing right actions for other reasons (e.g. reward or punishment).

(c) Virtues are habits of acting in certain ways which become so ingrained in us that we do them almost automatically, or without thinking about it.

(d) Just as animals attain fulfillment by following their instincts towards the life natural for them, human persons perform their natural function when they follow virtuous motives.

ANSWER: B. A describes one component of virtue, but Aristotle says that without the desire to do what is noble, correct judgment won't lead to right action. Virtues involve more thought than the mechanistic habits described in C. And contra D, human motives and dispositions are more malleable than those of other animals which don't need habituation to realize their telos.

5. In his Ethics Book IV ch.3, Aristotle portrays magnaminity or proper pride as the virtuous attitude towards honor, as opposed to being pusillanimous (or too self-effacing) and vain (or too desirous of honor for the wrong reasons). He emphasizes the independence of the magnanimous person because

(a) Determining our lives according to others' requirements to get their honor or their gifts is degrading and contrary to the internal self-respect that is essential for a happy life.

(b) The one who accepts no gifts but has everyone else in his debt has power over them.

(c) Since no honor is enough to reward his virtue appropriately, the magnanimous person disdains all honors, whoever they come from and whatever they are for.

(d) Since he is good, the magnanimous person cares only for the well-being of others, not his own happiness, and hence cannot be dependent on benefits others may provide.

ANSWER: A. He emphasizes giving more than receiving, but not only for power, as in B. Contra C, the magnanimous person does not reject appropriate honors from good persons, but appreciates them moderately. Contra D, the magnanimous person is also appropriately concerned for his eudaimonia.

6. In Book VIII of his Ethics, Aristotle writes: "Now those who wish good to their friend for the friend's own sake are friends most of all; for they have this attitude because of the friend himself, and not coincidentally." He means that

(a) they find no pleasure in the relationship or their actions towards their friend.

(b) they begin the friendship because their friend prompts them to, not just accidentally.

(d) if X feels and shows goodwill towards Y, then X is necessarily a true friend to Y.

ANSWER: C. D describes goodwill, but goodwill alone is not enough for friendship. B is a misinterpretation of the passage, and A is false.

7. In his discussion of self-love and selfishness (Book IX ch.8) Aristotle says, "And so the good person must be a self-lover, since he will both help himself and benefit others by doing fine actions. But the vicious person must not love himself, since he will harm both himself and his neighbors by following his base feelings" (p.147). By this he means that

(a) When we see it rightly, there is nothing wrong with egoism as the subordination of all other ends or goals to the pursuit of one's own happiness.

(b) The virtuous person does right by others and sacrifices for the common good of her society as a means to gaining the sense of pride or self-respect that is most vital for her happiness over a complete life.

(c) As Plato argued, the virtuous person secures their own happiness through virtue even if misfortune robs them of every other material resource or external good.

(d) By choosing what is great or fine for its own sake, even with this conflicts with the pursuit of our own advantage or pleasure, the virtuous person gains fulfillment from self-mastery and a sense of harmony in her soul.

ANSWER: D. B is close to right, but the virtuous person does not do what is noble as a means to some benefit from themselves, but as an end-in-itself. The benefit they derive is a side-effect or byproduct, as Feinberg also emphasizes. C is Plato's view but not Aristotle's, since we also need external goods and a minimum of good fortune to be happy.

8. MacIntyre distinguishes "goods internal to practices" and external goods as follows:

(a) Internal goods are those which can only be attained through a practice of the relevant sort, while external goods are attainable in many ways and only accidentally attached to a given practice by its place in our economy, culture, society etc.

(b) Internal goods are experienced as internal satisfaction, whereas external goods are satisfactions involving external physical objects or material resources.

(c) Internal goods include the technical skills exercised in a given practice, and the good of the institutions through which the practices provide a livelihood for their practitioners.

(d) The internal goods in practices are the moral virtues which all practices require, while the external goods are those honors and rewards for which practitioners compete.

ANSWER: A. Contra B, external goods aren't only physical pleasures, money, or property. They aren't "external" in this sense, but in the sense that they aren't goods the practice necessarily aims at. Contra C, technical skills and institutions are required to sustain the practices, but aren't the goods produced by the practices. Likewise virtues are required for practices, but each practice aims at specific goods apart from the general virtues.

9. Joel Feinberg uses the apocryphal story of Lincoln and the pigs (pp.560-1) to illustrate his point that, contrary to the psychological egoists' argument (4b), sometimes

(a) the fact that in any act we are acting on our own desire or doing what we want does not necessarily make motive behind that act (the intended goal) self-interested.

(b) deriving pleasure from attaining an end/goal we desire may imply or require that we desired that end/goal for its own sake, not as a means to the by-product pleasure;

(c) without caring for worthwhile goals and activities other than our own pleasure as ends-in-themselves, we will be unable to attain any genuine happiness or fulfillment;

(d) the fact that an apparently benevolent act might be surreptitiously self-serving or have an ulterior motive does not mean that we must always be slyly promoting our own interests when we seem outwardly altruistic.

ANSWER: B. A refers to the answer to argument (4a) for psychological egoism. Feinberg asserts C in the section on the paradox of hedonism, but that isn't the point of the Lincoln example. D is the answer to argument (4c) for egoism.