Philosophy of Human Nature

Final Exam Review Tips
(Updated December 11, 2001. Complete.)

These review notes constitute a very brief guide, just to give you examples of the sort of thing you should study (so questions about things not specifically mentioned here are fair game!). The notes begin with Descartes, but the exam is cumulative, and likely to include questions comparing thinkers we studied later in the semester with those studied earlier. The exam is open book/open note, but do not use the course packet, and do not put quotes in your answers. You should not try to prepare answers you can simply copy during the exam. The questions cannot be exactly anticipated. The best thing is to have a good sense of the main points from each author, and be able to apply them.

Descartes

-- What are the three main doubt-generators described in Meditations I

-- What is the aim or goal of Descartes's method of doubt?

-- On p.19 Descartes says "At this time I admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing, that is a mind or intellect..." It is not necessarily true that he is also a body, because it is possible that he exists without a body. How does he think he has shown that this is possible?

-- On p.19 again Descartes says that he may very well (or probably does) have a body. "But is it perhaps the case that these very things which I take to be nothing, because they are unknown to me, nevertheless are in fact no different from that "me" that I know?" For example, perhaps he has a brain that thinks. But he says that his self-knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of anything physical, which is less certain: "I ask who is this 'I' whom I know? Most certainly, in the strict sense the knowledge of this 'I' does not depend upon things of whose existence I do not yet have knowledge" (p.19). This implies that we have immediate knowledge of ourselves that does not require knowledge of anything else. What might Robert Ehman say in response to this?

-- How does the example of the wax help Descartes show that particular physical bodies are not more distinctly known via sensation than the mind is known distinctly by itself?

-- In Meditation VI, Descartes argues that "the mind, when it understands, in a sense turns toward itself and looks at one of the ideas that are in it; whereas when it imagaines, it turns towards the body, and intuits in the body something that conforms to an idea..." (p.48). Compare this to Plato's distinction between picturable objects and the abstract concepts or ideas that are reflected in particular spatiotemporal objects.

-- InMeditation VI again, Descartes defends the idea that he has a clear and distinct idea of himself apart from his body, even if it is very closely joined to him. How does he define the essential features of thought and bodies to mark the clear difference between them? Does this at least show that there is a mystery as to how thought could arise from anything like brain-states?

Rousseau

-- What two kinds of motive does Rousseau think are essential to human beings in their natural state? He summarizes these in the preface (p.35). How does his understanding of what makes us persons differ from Plato's?

-- In Part I of his "Second Discourse" Rousseau complains about the extremes of decadence and indigence emerging in supposedly civilized nations of Europe. "The extreme inequality of our lifestyle: excessive idleness among some, excessive labor among others..." (p.42). Compare this to Plato's critique of oligarchy. Compare it to Marx's critique of the separation of capitalist owner and worker.

-- Rousseau says, "Nature commands every animal and beasts obey. Man feels the same impetus, but he knows he is free to go along or to resist" (p.45). Compare this with Augustine's argument that we are responsible for our sins since nothing but our own will can make us slaves to cupidity or inordinate desire.

-- How does Rousseau argue that for the force of natural pity, rather than reason, is the source of our social virtues (pp.53-55)? Compare and contrast this with Augustine's view that we have an innate conscience, including standards of evaluative judgment we use to evaluate our actions and desires.

-- Rousseau distinguishes between physical desire and the "sentiment of love," which he sees as an "artificial sentiment, born of social custom and extolled by women with so much skill and care in order to establish their hegemony..." (p.56). Is Rousseau right that in love relationships there is competition between the partners, as well as between different rivals for the same lover? Contrast this with Robert Ehman's view of authentic sexual relationships.

-- Why does Rousseau think that competition, hostility, and a desire for revenge are absent in the state of nature>? Why does he think men starting seeking revenge once social relations begin (p.64)? Compare his critique of honor-seeking men to Plato's critique of timocracy.

-- How does Rousseau describe early communities which he thinks were the best for human beings? (p.65). Is he right that once people cannot work alone competition will appear? Why might Marx have a different understanding of the possible cooperation among workers?

-- Like Ehman, Rousseau believes that inequalities arise largely from differences in talents and luck (p.67). But why does Rousseau, unlike Ehman, think that these inequalities will magnify until they destroy the possibility of a decent life?

-- How does Rousseau think that leaders first justify the institution of "rules of justice and peace" and laws protecting property? What does he think the actual motive for such laws really was? How does he think this leads eventually to tyranny?

-- Rousseau agrees with Plato that a good prince is one whose laws will be "always directed to the public good" (p.73). However, he argues that tyranny is unjust in a different way than Plato did, by appealing to the notion of our inalienable freedom (p.74). Would Buber or Ehman agree with this idea? How would they argue against tyrannical domination of people?

Marx

--Marx says that we should not proceed from an imagined "state of nature" in human nature and society, but from concrete economic fact (p.71). How does this lead him to a diagnosis of our social problems that differs from Rousseau's?

--Marx describes three aspects of alienation in our work or labor. What are these three aspects, and how is each related to his notion of our human essence or species-being?

--How does Marx describe our "species being" or what makes human beings distinctive and different from all other animals (p.76)? How does his description of "spontaneous activity, free activity" (p.77) imply that we are capable of non-acquisitive motivation? Compare and contrast this view of what makes us persons with Descartes's view. Could this difference result from Marx's focus on how it is natural for us to act, as opposed to Descartes's question about what we can know with certainty about ourselves?

--When we work in the distinctively human way, Marx thinks our products will be an objectification or expression of ourselves: "The worker puts his life into the object..." (p.72). And thus our works, from the smallest product of handicrafts to our laws and institutions, our grandest public buildings, reflect our spirit: man "contemplates himself in a world that he has created" (p.76). How would Buber alter this account of our creative work?

--Marx believes that other people can rob us of our labor and stand in a competitive relation with us. But why does he still think that "man's relation to himself only becomes objective and real for him through his relation to other men" (p.78)? In other words, he thinks we are essentially social beings when we live fully human lives, when our labor is "an end in itself" (p.79). Could we say that this is because our works are a kind of communication of ourselves to others, who must acknowledge and respond?

--Give examples of what Marx means by being alienated from the process of labor. Marx fears that when one is are alienated this way, he "does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind." Compare this to Dewey's concern about the kinds of social relationship that develop each individual's full potential, and "his intelligent interest in what he is doing" in work in particular (Dewey, Democracy and Education, p.98).

Dewey

--In Freedom and Culture how does Dewey argue that social relations are not simply derived from the psychology of separate human beings, nor are the motives and roles of particular individuals determined simply determined by fixed social relationships of sociological laws. Can we be both essentially individual and independent, while also being essentially social and interdependent?

--What criticism does Dewey raise against Marx's understanding of economic law and historical change? Why does he think that claims to certainty in these areas can lead to dogmatism and a refusal to tolerate dissent? How does he portray true scientific inquiry, by contrast, on the model of democracy (Freedom and Culture p.81)?

--What is Dewey's main criticism of "Laissez-faire individualism" or libertarian political ideology (Freedom and Culture, p.71, 83, 91-92). Why does he deny that democracy requires unlimited free-market capitalism?

--How does Dewey defend 20th-century democracy against Marxist criticisms (Freedom and Culture p.76)?

-- In Democracy and Education why does Dewey think that isolation breeds rigidity and conservativism that will not be good for the members of such communities. Apply this to contemporary examples. Would this suggest that a sharp separation between economic classes could be harmful to the development of their members? Would this provide an answer to Ehman's view that large-scale economic inequality can be tolerated without posing any threat to our development as authentic selves?

-- In Democracy and Education Dewey gives two criteria to measure how well forms of social life approximate the ideal. How does he argue on this basis for a democratic society that will develop the full talents, intelligence, and sensibility of each individual. Does this provide an adequate balance between our essential relation to others, and our freedom as unique individuals?

-- Every thinker we read gave us some conception of human nature which determined what kind of life is best for human beings. Dewey is different in that he denies any fixed social structure as the best, and argues for a continual process of development and progress both in our cultures and in our ideal of human existence as well. Compare and contrast this with Plato's view of the ideal republic.

Buber

I have given you seom sense of points on which you might compare Buber to the other thinkers we have read. Also consult your handout on Buber.

--I suggested that for Marx, we communicate ourselves to others through our works, and we develop a sense of community by cooperation with them. Buber thinks there is a more direct way of communicating reciprocally with other persons. How does he describe this I-Thou relation as unmediated by an intervening item, such as a work, a shared project, or even language in the ordinary sense?

Think of the I-Thou encounter as a way of really being present to someone else without disguise or agenda, at least for a few moments in time. Buber also describes this as something that requires reciprocation, and a sense that we are brought together by the power of relation itself. Does this accurately describe some of our encounters with other persons? Is it a form of love?

-- Buber describes the I-Thou encounter in terms of exclusiveness, and says that in this relation we find the whole person in their unity, rather than some aspect of them (pp.58-59). How does he relate this to a sense of freedom from determination by external forces?

-- How does Buber argue that the longing for I-Thou relationships is innate in every human child?

-- What is Buber's criticism of the mystical understanding of our relationship to God? Why does he think that God needs us?

-- Why does Buber think that hating someone is closer to an I-Thou relationship towards them than is an attitude of neutral indifference? Compare this to Ehman's view that we cannot hate someone we think has no authentic personality, someone who is 'void' for us.

Ehman

Many of the questions I might ask about Ehman have been indicated already, and you have a handout to consult. Here are a couple more.

-- How does Ehman define the Kantian principle of morality which he spells out in terms of five different categories of rights and responsibilities?

-- Ehman argues that our attempt to live an impersonal or anonymous life of to lose ourselves in our public roles is an attempt to avoid facing the "otherness of a genuine other" which we cannot interpret simply in terms of our projects and our desires. We have to experience this other person from their own point of view. Why, like Buber, and unlike Sartre, does Ehman think that this experience is positive for us?

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