III
Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the
effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in
contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule.
IV
Towards the effecting of works, all that man can do is to put together or put asunder
natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working within.
VII
The productions of the mind and hand seem very numerous in books and manufactures. But
all this variety lies in an exquisite subtlety and derivations from a few things already
known; not in the number of axioms.
VIII
Moreover the works already known are due to chance and experiment rather
than to science; for the sciences we now possess are merely systems for the nice ordering
and setting forth of things already invented; not methods of invention or directions for
new works.
XI
As the sciences which we now have do not help us in finding out
new works, so neither does the logic which we now have help us in finding out new
sciences.
XII
The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the errors which have
their foundation in commonly received notions than to help the search after truth. So it
does more harm than good.
XIV
The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consists of words,
words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of
the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no
firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.
XIX
There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one
flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these
principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment
and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives
axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that
it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet
untried.
XXII
Both ways set out from the senses and particulars, and rest in the
highest generalities; but the difference between them is infinite. For the one just
glances at experiment and particulars in passing, the other dwells duly and orderly among
them. The one, again, begins at once by establishing certain abstract and useless
generalities, the other rises by gradual steps to that which is prior and better known in
the order of nature.
XXIV
It cannot be that axioms established by argumentation should avail for
the discovery of new works; since the subtlety of nature is greater many times over than
the subtlety of argument. But axioms duly and orderly formed from particulars easily
discover the way to new particulars, and thus render sciences active.
XXV
The axioms now in use, having been suggested by a scanty and manipular experience and a
few particulars of most general occurrence, are made for the most part just large enough
to fit and take these in: and therefore it is no wonder if they do not lead to new
particulars. And if some opposite instance, not observed or not known before, chance to
come in the way, the axiom is rescued and preserved by some frivolous distinction; whereas
the truer course would be to correct the axiom itself.
XXXI
It is idle to expect any great advancement in science from the
superinducing and engraving of new things upon old. We must begin anew from the very
foundations, unless we would revolve for ever in a circle with mean and contemptible
progress.
XXXVI
One method of delivery alone remains to us; which is simply this: We
must lead men to the particulars themselves, and their series and order; while men on
their side must force themselves for awhile to lay their notions by and begin to
familiarise themselves with facts.
XLVI
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as
being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to
support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to
be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some
distinction sets aside and rejects; in order that by this great and pernicious
predetermination the authority of its former conclusions may remain inviolate. And
therefore it was a good answer that was made by one who when they showed him hanging in a
temple a picture of those who had paid their vows as having escaped shipwreck, and would
have him say whether he did not now acknowledge the power of the gods,-"Aye,"
asked he again, "but where are they painted that were drowned, after their
vows?" And such is the way of all superstition, whether in astrology, dreams, omens,
divine judgments, or the like; wherein men, having a delight in such vanities, mark the
events where they are fulfilled, but where they fail, though this happen much oftener,
neglect and pass them by. But with far more subtlety does this mischief insinuate itself
into philosophy and the sciences; in which the first conclusion colours and brings into
conformity with itself all that come after, though far sounder and better. Besides,
independently of that delight and vanity which I have described, it is the peculiar and
perpetual error of human intellect to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than by
negatives; whereas it ought properly to hold itself indifferently disposed towards both
alike. Indeed in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance is the more
forcible of the two.
C
But not only is a greater abundance of experiments to be sought for and procured, and
that too of a different kind from those hitherto tried; an entirely different method,
order, and process for carrying on and advancing experience must also be introduced. For
experience, when it wanders in its own track, is, as I have already remarked, mere groping
in the dark, and confounds men rather than instructs them. But when it shall proceed in
accordance with a fixed law, in regular order, and without interruption, then may better
things be hoped of knowledge.
CIV
The understanding must not however be allowed to jump and fly from particulars to
remote axioms and of almost the highest generality (such as the first principles, as they
are called, of arts and things), and taking stand upon them as truths that cannot be
shaken, proceed to prove and frame the middle axioms by reference to them; which has been
the practice hitherto; the understanding being not only carried that way by a natural
impulse, but also by the use of syllogistic demonstration trained and inured to it. But
then, and then only, may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just scale of ascent, and
by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms;
and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most general. For
the lowest axioms differ but slightly from bare experience, while the highest and most
general (which we now have) are notional and abstract and without solidity. But the middle
are the true and solid and living axioms, on which depend the affairs and fortunes of men;
and above them again, last of all, those which are indeed the most general; such I mean as
are not abstract, but of which those intermediate axioms are really limitations.
The understanding must not therefore be supplied with
wings, but rather hung with weights, to keep it from leaping and flying. Now this has
never been done; when it is done, we may entertain better hopes of the sciences.
CV
In establishing axioms, another form of induction must be devised than has hitherto
been employed; and it must be used for proving and discovering not first principles (as
they are called) only, but also the lesser axioms, and the middle, and indeed all. For the
induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is childish; its conclusions are
precarious, and exposed to peril from a contradictory instance; and it generally decides
on too small a number of facts, and on those only which are at hand. But the induction
which is to be available for the discovery and demonstration of sciences and arts, must
analyse nature by proper rejections and exclusions; and then, after a sufficient number of
negatives, come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances; which has not yet been done
or even attempted, save only by Plato, who does indeed employ this form of induction to a
certain extent for the purpose of discussing definitions and ideas. But in order to
furnish this induction or demonstration well and duly for its work, very many things are
to be provided which no mortal has yet thought of: insomuch that greater labour will have
to be spent in it than has hitherto been spent on the syllogism. And this induction must
be used not only to discover axioms, but also in the formation of notions. And it is in
this induction that our chief hope lies.
CVI
But in establishing axioms by this kind of induction, we must also examine and try
whether the axiom so established be framed to the measure of those particulars only from
which it is derived, or whether it be larger and wider. And if it be larger and wider, we
must observe whether by indicating to us new particulars it confirm that wideness and
largeness as by a collateral security; that we may not either stick fast in things already
known, or loosely grasp at shadows and abstract forms; not at things solid and realised in
matter. And when the process shall have come into use, then at last shall we see the dawn
of a solid hope.]
The following is Aphorism X from the Second Book of
Aphorisms.
Now my directions for the interpretation of nature embrace two generic divisions; the
one how to educe and form axioms from experience; the other how to deduce and derive new
experiments from axioms. The former again is divided into three ministrations; a
ministration to the sense, a mainstration to the memory, and a ministration to the mind or
reason.
For first of all we must prepare a Natural and Experimental History, sufficient
and good; and this is the foundation of all; for we are not to imagine or suppose, but to
discover, what nature does or may be made to do.
But natural and experimental history is so various and diffuse, that it confounds and
distracts the understanding, unless it be ranged and Presented to view in a suitable
order. We must therefore form Tables and Arrangements of Instances, in such a
method and order that the understanding may be able to deal with them.
And even when this is done, still the understanding, if left to itself and its own
spontaneous movements, is incompetent and unfit to form axioms, unless it be directed and
guarded. Therefore in the third place we must use Induction, true and legitimate
induction, which is the very key of interpretation.
