Seminar Series

Seminar Series Fall 2025

Organizers: Utteeyo Dasgupta & Jacqueline Reid ([email protected]).

 

September 9 | 4:00 p.m. |  In person & Zoom option 

Seminar Title: Legislating Longevity: State-Level Public Health Laws and the Mortality Transition 

Abstract: State legislators passed numerous public health laws during the twentieth century, most of which likely had negligible effects on mortality. Using data from the universe of state-level public health laws and regulations, this paper tests whether these laws collectively can account for a meaningful fraction of the mortality transition. To account for the endogeneity of public health laws, I instrument for public health laws using the legislative schedule, the length of legislative sessions, and legislator salaries. Both panel IV and OLS estimates suggest laws reduced mortality. A text analysis of the laws reveals that laws regarding housing/tenements, drug safety, and the collection of vital statistics are most associated with mortality declines.

Speaker: Martin Saavedra (Associate Professor, Rutgers University). 

Martin Saavedra is an Associate Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, and a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Before moving to New Jersey, he was the William and Jeanette Smith Associate Professor of Economics at Oberlin College. His research focuses on economic history, health economics, and labor economics, and his work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Economic Literature, and the Economic Journal. He has also served on the Editorial Board of Explorations in Economic History. 

 

September 16 | 4:00 p.m. | In-person & Zoom option 

Seminar Title: Altruism and the Endowment Effect 

Abstract: Using random assignment in an online laboratory setting to different orderings of a sequence of charitable donation solicitations and a tangible item auction, we conduct a preregistered study of whether altruistic behavior plays a causal role in reducing the endowment effect. We use a social norming treatment and a framing treatment to exogenously stimulate giving, observing the effects on the WTA-WTP disparity in the subsequent auction. We also employ several construal level manipulation checks. Our experimental manipulations show that induced giving reduces the endowment effect. We also find robust evidence of a negative association between altruism and the endowment effect, consistent with prior work. The results provide a possible explanation for the survival of altruism in market contexts and offer potential insights for devising new policy solutions to address public goods problems. 

Speaker: Matthew G. Nagler (Professor, City College of New York).  

Matthew G. Nagler is Professor of Economics at The City College of New York and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Previously, he served on the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in the White House of President Barack Obama. He specializes in behavioral economics, social economics, and applied microeconomics and has published in the Journal of Public Economics, Political Science Quarterly, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, and numerous other refereed journals. His current work relates to the effects of altruistic behavior on innovation and the efficient function of markets. 

 

September 23 | 4:00 p.m. | In-person & Zoom option

Seminar Title: Front-line Courts as State Capacity: Evidence from India 

Abstract: Front-line courts handle the bulk of legal cases and yet they are severely under-resourced, with potential implications for economic development. Using rich court-level panel data from India, constructed using the universe of legal case records, and an event study research design, I show that an increase in judge staffing levels substantially reduces case backlog in district courts, and subsequently improves the productivity of local formal sector firms. One of the key mechanisms driving these effects is the last mile enforcement of credit contracts, which enables banks to lend more to the industrial sector. Hiring district judges is highly cost-effective. 

Paper link: https://manaswinirao.com/files/rao_courts.pdf 

Speaker: Manaswini Rao (Assistant Professor, University of Delaware). 

Manaswini Rao is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Delaware’s Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics. Her research investigates how dispute resolution institutions, particularly the frontline judiciary, affects the economic development process. More broadly, her research agenda includes topics on institutions, collective action, cooperation, and wealth inequality with a focus on structural transformation in India. She received her PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics from UC Berkeley in 2020. 

 

September 30 | 4:00 p.m. | In-person & Zoom option

Seminar Title: Trust and Healthcare-Seeking Behavior 

Abstract: We present results from a nationally representative survey of American adults, guided by a simple theoretical model expressing health care-seeking behavior as a function of economic and behavioral fundamentals and highlighting the pivotal role of trust. We establish several facts. First, we document a strong association between higher levels of trust and reported care-seeking behavior, both retrospective and anticipated. This relationship holds across several care scenarios, from routine check-ups to vaccinations. Second, the impact of trust on health care utilization is similar in magnitude to that of factors such as income and education, long recognized as crucial in the existing literature. Third, key mechanisms from our theoretical framework, notably individuals’ beliefs about the medical system's effectiveness in managing their health and their personal disutility tied to medical visits, present strong associations with individuals’ levels of trust. Additionally, our exploration into trust within various health care sectors reveals similar correlations with care-seeking behavior, notably highlighting the substantial influence of trust in the CDC particularly concerning flu vaccinations. Finally, we find no statistical difference in the relationship between trust and care-seeking for Black respondents, but we find important differences by age and political affiliation. 

Speaker: Mario Macis (Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School). 

Mario Macis, PhD is a Professor of Economics at the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, a member of the Core Faculty and Leadership Team of the Hopkins Business of Health Initiative, Affiliate Faculty at the Berman Institute of Bioethics, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). His research contributes to the fields of health, labor, development economics, and market design. His work was published in leading academic journals, including the American Economic Review, the Journal of Health Economics, the Journal of Labor Economics, the Journal of Development Economics, Management Science, and Science. 

 

October 21 | 4:00 p.m. | In-person & Zoom option

Seminar Title: Learning and Efficiency in the Market for Physician Referrals   

Abstract: In many areas of care, primary care physicians (PCPs) greatly influence a patient's choice of specialist, but how well do PCPs learn about specialist quality, if at all? In this paper, we study PCP referrals to specialists, using the population of orthopedic procedures for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries from 2008 through 2018. We document substantial heterogeneity in specialist quality and cost within geographic markets, and we present design-based evidence that PCPs adjust their referrals specifically based on the outcomes of their own patients. We then employ a structural learning model to measure the effects of uncertainty in physician referrals and to simulate possible reallocations when there is better information about quality. We find that one-third of these patients would be referred to a different specialist in the absence of informational frictions, with small but meaningful improvements in patient quality of care. 

Speaker: Seth Richards-Shubik (Winter Family Associate Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins University). 

Seth Richards-Shubik is the Winter Family Associate Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Johns Hopkins University.  His research interests are in health economics and applied econometrics, particularly in medical service markets, network models, and health inequality.  His current research studies optimal contracting for medical services and referrals for specialty care, along with methods for estimating the production of health and testing for spillovers in networks.  Professor Richards-Shubik received his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania, and has an MPA from Syracuse University and a BA from Harvard University.  Prior to joining Hopkins, he was on the faculties of Carnegie Mellon University and Lehigh University. 

 

October 23 | 4:00 p.m. | In person & Zoom option 

 Danila Serra 

 

October 22 | 4:00 p.m. | In person & Zoom option 

Seminar Title: Lies, Truths, and Perceptions: Misaligned Beliefs in Sender-Receiver Deception Games

Abstract: Deception occurs across domains—from law enforcement to markets and social media. While experimental economics has advanced our understanding of why people lie (Abeler et al., 2019; Gneezy et al., 2018), far less is known about how individuals detect and respond to deception. Most work focuses on senders; we study receivers. Do receivers anticipate lies accurately? Do senders adapt to these beliefs We conducted a large online experiment (N≈2000) using modified die-roll and matrix tasks in an incentivized sender-receiver design. In Part 1, “senders” reported outcomes under two conditions: paid regardless of believability or paid only if believed. In Part 2, “receivers” judged these reports and wagered on accuracy We find systematic misalignments. In the die-roll task, receivers are overly skeptical of moderate values, ignoring that most lies are small. In the matrix task, they are not skeptical enough of high claims, which are often dishonest. Receivers also fail to adjust to senders’ incentives, while senders underuse strategically optimal “sweet spot” claims. Behavior departs from Bayesian predictions. 

Speaker: Ben Ho (Professor, Vassar College). 

Ben Ho is a professor of economics at Vassar College and author of the book Why Trust Matters: An Economist's Guide to the Ties that Bind Us, a book the New Yorker says "writes lucidly and compellingly about the foundational concept of all social science." Ho applies behavioral economics, game theory and experiments to tackle topics like apologies, identity, inequality and climate change. Before Vassar, he taught MBA students at Cornell (where he was selected as one of Poets' and Quants' "40 under 40"), served as lead energy economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers, and worked/consulted for Morgan Stanley and several tech startups. Professor Ho is also a faculty affiliate for the Center for Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. His research has appeared in outlets like Management Science and Nature: Human Behavior. Ho holds seven degrees from Stanford and MIT in economics, education, political science, math, computer science and electrical engineering. 

 

November 11 | 4:00 p.m. | In person & Zoom option

Seminar Title: Evolution of institutional designs: endogenizing the history of allocation procedures for the Indian civil services 

Abstract: In India, the allocation of elite civil servants to a particular state matters for that state's development and growth. So, when, how, and why are the institutions governing the allocation of elite civil servants reformed? In this paper, I endogenize the evolution of allocation procedures used to assign Indian Administrative, Police, and Forest Service officers to states across India post-Independence. Using detailed knowledge of the history of matching mechanisms and the civil servants' rank-order preferences, I highlight the constant struggle over allocation procedures between the Prime Minister and the civil service. The Prime Minister wants a more equitable distribution of bureaucratic quality across the country for balanced growth and development. Whereas the civil service wants more weight to be given to their own preferences over where to work. The aspirations of the executive and the bureaucracy remain at odds with one another because bureaucrats' preferences are correlated: avoiding lifelong assignments to underdeveloped areas and conflict zones. I find that over time the institutional pendulum swings between allocation procedures the Prime Minister favors and those that the bureaucracy favors, depending on the strength of the Prime Minister. Strong Prime Ministers (proxied by majority governments) can resist pressure from the bureaucracy. Thereby, they institute allocation procedures that achieve a more equitable balance of bureaucratic quality across the country, albeit by giving bureaucrats’ preferences less weight or restricting their ability to express certain types of preferences. On the other hand, weak Prime Ministers (proxied by coalition governments) are more prone to the bureaucracy’s pressure. In turn, they institute allocation procedures that give most bureaucrats more preferred assignments, though this comes at the expense of disadvantaged regions systematically receiving lower-quality bureaucrats. 

Speaker: Ashutosh Thakur (Assistant Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy NUS) 

Ashutosh Thakur is an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at NUS. Ashutosh holds his Ph.D. from Stanford University's Graduate School of Business and A.B. Economics from Princeton University. His research applies tools of market design to political economy, with a focus on institutional stability and organizational productivity. For example, he studies mechanisms allocating elite civil servants to states in India and party-specific mechanisms for assigning politicians to committees in the US Senate. He develops tools and techniques in matching theory that can be used in these instances to better understand the problem (empirically and theoretically) and to design better mechanisms (an engineering perspective). 

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