School of Law

World trade is becoming increasingly weaponized, and it’s clear that there needs to be more rules—but the World Trade Organization’s deliberative processes are at a standstill. Instead of relying on adjudication, Professor Harlan Cohen proposes developing better practices for trade-security measures.

In her most recent article, Professor Atinuke O. Adediran explores the political and legal implications of "racial targets," the voluntary goals adopted by organizations to hire or promote people of color.

In vast numbers of debt collection cases, defendants never appear, leading courts to routinely issue default judgments, often rubber-stamping complaints, with devastating results for defendants’ credit, employment, and housing. In this article, Professor Pamela K. Bookman explores, analyzes, and critiques the flaws in such default procedures.

AI is transforming how we live and work, but it can also be wrong, biased, and manipulative. While others have focused on technological solutions, Professor Chinmayi Sharma proposes a licensing framework that would professionalize the engineers who are building AI tech. She asks, “What if, like doctors, AI engineers also vowed to do no harm.”

To win a trademark infringement case, plaintiffs must prove they own a valid trademark and the defendant's similar mark confuses consumers. Professors Sepehr Shahshahani and Maggie Wittlin argue that plaintiffs should also prove the confusion stems from protected trademark features. They call this the “missing element” in infringement cases and propose a concrete, practical solution.

U.S. law treats dead bodies as quasi-persons, often protecting them against denigration. Professor Ela Leshem analyzes these dignity protections, and considers how her analysis casts a critical light on the mistreatment of some dead bodies– especially Black, Brown, and poor dead bodies. She also points the way for research on the law’s treatment of other entities, including AI models.

Professor Sean J. Griffith examines corporate speech rights, including the right to "negative speech" (the ability to refrain from speaking). Proposing a theory of corporate First Amendment rights grounded in the doctrine of corporate purpose, he argues that publicly traded corporations, primarily driven by maximizing shareholder wealth, possess limited First Amendment protections. Under this theory, the government can regulate corporate speech that diverges from this core purpose of wealth maximization. At the same time, the government <em>can</em> compel corporate speech when the regulation is consonant with corporate purpose.